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FRAGMENTATION NODES: A STUDY IN
FINANCIAL INNOVATION, COMPLEXITY
AND SYSTEMIC RISK
Kathryn Judge*
This Article presents a case study in how complexity arising from the evolution and proliferation of a financial innovation can increase systemic risk. The
subject of the case study is the securitization of home loans, an innovation which
played a critical and still not fully understood-role in the 2007-2009 financial
crisis. The Article   introduces   the   term   “fragmentation  node”   for   these   transaction structures, and it shows how specific sources of complexity inherent in fragmentation nodes limited transparency and flexibility in ways that undermined the
stability of the financial system. In addition to shedding new light on the
processes through which financial innovations become so complex and how that
complexity contributes to new sources of systemic risk, the Article considers the
tools regulators will need to tackle these sources of systemic risk. The policy
analysis shows that disclosure, a tool commonly used in financial regulation, will
not suffice. At times, regulators should target these new sources of systemic risk
directly by seeking to reduce the length and complexity of the chain connecting
investor and investment. The Article suggests some modest steps regulators could
have taken prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, such as a transaction tax targeting serial fragmentation nodes, to illustrate how such reforms might work in
practice. It also explains why the dynamics revealed in this case study are almost
certain to arise again, even if in slightly different form.
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INTRODUCTION
Two of the most pressing issues in financial regulation are the regulation of
systemic risk and the increasing complexity of the capital markets.1 This Ar1. See, e.g., Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 673 (2010) (“Going forward, the central problem for financial regulation . . . is to reduce systemic risk.”);;  Steven  L.  Schwarcz,  Regulating
Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 212-13 (2009) (identifying
complexity “as the greatest financial-market challenge of the future”   and   one   of the three
core causes of the 2007-2009 financial crisis).
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ticle sheds new light on each of these issues and the connection between them
through a case study of a particular financial innovation that played a key role
in the 2007-2009 financial crisis—the securitization of home loans.
This examination comes at a critical juncture for systemic risk and its regulation. Many of the key reforms adopted in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act) and other policy responses
to the 2007-2009 financial crisis seek to increase the stability of the financial
system by imposing new costs and restrictions on banks and other large financial institutions.2 While such regulations may increase the stability of the financial institutions regulated, they also increase the economic gains from financial
innovations that shift financing activities out of regulated institutions and into
the capital markets. Securitization is precisely such an innovation. Securitization entails the pooling of a group of cash-producing assets, like home loans,
into a newly created entity against which multiple classes of securities are issued. The structures created—which this Article  calls  “fragmentation  nodes”—
are a critical feature of the shadow banking system through which the capital
markets provide close substitutes for goods and services historically provided
by banks.3 As a result, the economic gains from innovations like securitization
are likely to be even greater in the years ahead than they were in the years leading up to the financial crisis. It also means that the reforms adopted to produce
a more stable financial system are unlikely to achieve that aim unless complemented by efforts to address the corresponding changes they are likely to induce in the capital markets.
Even if inadequately addressed in the policy reforms adopted thus far, this
point is not novel. There is a significant and growing body of literature on the
interplay between the traditional banking sector and the capital markets and
ways that we might extend the types of regulations used to limit systemic risk
in the traditional banking sector to the capital markets.4 This Article goes further. It argues that the shadow banking system not only gives rise to sources of
systemic risk akin to those that arise in the traditional banking sector, but that it
also gives rise to new sources of systemic risk for which we have no precedent.
This Article’s  central  claim  is  that  specific  sources  of  complexity  inherent  
in fragmentation nodes—core features of the shadow banking system—impede
transparency and flexibility in ways that increase systemic risk. More specifically, it identifies particular sources of complexity inherent in fragmentation

2. See Part I.C, infra.
3. E.g., Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System,

BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 261 (2010) (describing the central role played by the
shadow banking system in the 2007-2009 financial crisis and identifying securitization as
one of three core components of the shadow banking system); Erik F. Gerding, The Shadow
Banking System and Its Legal Origins 11, 13-14, 15, 17-18 (Working Paper, 2012) (on file
with author) (describing the growth of the shadow banking system and identifying securitization as the system’s  “central  artery”).
4. See infra Part I.B.
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nodes; it explains why, as a theoretical matter, those sources of complexity may
give rise to systemic risk as fragmentation nodes backed by a particular asset
type spread; and it draws on evidence suggesting that the theorized sources of
systemic risk became manifest and contributed to the 2007-2009 financial crisis. By focusing on sources of complexity that are likely to be present in other
financial innovations that may be devised to move financing activities out of
banks and into the shadow banking system, this Article suggests that these dynamics are likely to arise again. It also enables policymakers and market participants to identify new financial innovations as potentially troubling even if, superficially, they can be distinguished from the securitization vehicles backed by
home loans that were central to the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
In addition to contributing to the conversation about systemic risk generally, this Article also draws upon and contributes to two more narrow bodies of
work. One of these bodies consists of the numerous accounts of the processes
through which the securitization of home loans contributed to the 2007-2009
financial crisis,5 and the other body focuses on the interactions among financial
innovation, complexity, and systemic risk more generally.6 Premised on the
commonly held assumption that the 2007-2009 financial crisis was the result of
myriad causes, this Article seeks to complement rather than displace these alternative accounts.7 Its contributions arise largely from its methodology. By
approaching these issues through a case study of how the complexity that resulted as a particular financial innovation arose, evolved, spread, and became a
significant source of systemic risk, it provides valuable new insights into the
processes through which financial innovations become so complex and into the
challenges and opportunities facing regulators charged with reducing systemic
risk.
The case study begins with a brief history of the evolution and proliferation
of mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs) backed by MBSs.8 MBSs and CDOs are created through securitization

5. See infra Parts III and sources cited therein.
6. See, e.g., FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED

FINANCIAL MARKETS (2d ed. 2009); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity and
Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, 14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 663
(2008); Schwarcz, supra note 1; Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of
Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457
(1993) (book review).
7. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya, Thomas Cooley, Matthew Richardson & Ingo Walter,
Manufacturing Tail Risk: A Perspective on the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 4 FOUND. &
TRENDS FIN. 247, 292 (2009) [hereinafter Acharya et al., Tail Risk] (“There  is  no  shortage  of  
proximate  causes  of  the  financial  crisis.”);;  Bill Thomas, Keith Hennessey & Douglas HoltzEakin, What Caused the Financial Crisis?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2011, at A21 (  “[T]he crisis
was the product of 10 factors. Only when taken together can they offer a sufficient explanation of what happened[.]”).
8. Except when context otherwise requires, the term CDO is used in this article to refer to CDO transactions in which MBSs constitute one of the primary underlying assets. The
THE
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transactions in which assets (mortgages and MBSs, respectively) are bundled
together into a newly created entity against which securities are issued. This
account draws attention to the fact that these complex transaction structures are
the product of a series of incremental innovations that accumulated over time.
The incremental nature of this process is critical to understanding how these
transactions became so complex and why that complexity was not subject to
greater regulatory or market scrutiny prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
The case study introduces the term “fragmentation node” for the nexus of
contractual and other arrangements put into place each time an MBS or CDO is
consummated. This term draws attention to the way such transactions permanently transform the relationship between investor and investment, making it
easier to conceptualize the ways that the spread of MBSs and CDOs fundamentally altered the landscape of the capital markets. The descriptive account also
examines the attributes of fragmentation nodes that make them complex. Four
specific sources of complexity—fragmentation, the creation of contingent and
dynamic economic interests in the underlying assets, a latent competitive tendency among different classes of investors, and the lengthening of the chain separating an investor from the assets ultimately underlying its investment—are
highlighted. Identifying these specific sources of complexity is critical to the
analysis that follows. While the term “complexity” appears often in descriptions of modern finance, it has been used accurately but loosely to describe a
wide array of phenomena. Defining the complexity at issue more narrowly
enables this Article to examine with greater precision the effects of that complexity.
The Article builds upon its descriptive foundation by examining how the
identified sources of complexity contribute to two distinct sources of systemic
risk—information loss and stickiness. Its approach to each merges theory about
why the identified sources of complexity may be expected to give rise to the
phenomenon and why each phenomenon, in turn, may be expected to increase
systemic risk with evidence from the 2007-2009 financial crisis. More specifically, the Article shows how the spread of fragmentation nodes led to a pervasive loss of information about the quality of the underlying home loans and the
value of MBS and CDO securities backed by them. This loss of information
likely contributed to the bubbles that preceded the 2007-2009 financial crisis,
and it set the stage for the paralyzing uncertainty which was critical to the unfolding of the crisis. Similarly, coordination problems arising from the fragmentation and repackaging of economic interests in home loans made it exceptionally difficult to modify the terms of those loans, making the original terms
of   the   loans   more   “sticky” than they would otherwise be. The resultant stickiness in the original terms of the underlying loans increased the likelihood of
foreclosure. The excess foreclosures that resulted caused home prices to fall
term MBS is used for transactions backed by residential mortgages, not commercial property.
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further, setting off a feedback loop of rising defaults, more foreclosures, and
further price declines. While these phenomena have been noted in other accounts of the crisis, this Article is the first to show how each arises from specific sources of complexity inherent in the packaging of home loans into fragmentation nodes.
The Article concludes by considering the type of policies that are likely to
be effective in reducing these sources of systemic risk. Once we recognize the
systemic consequences of the highlighted sources of complexity, we can appreciate why it may be appropriate, and perhaps even necessary, for regulators to
target that complexity directly. Prior to the crisis, regulators could have done
this by discouraging serial fragmentation nodes (like CDOs containing MBSs)
and encouraging simpler alternatives (like covered bonds). Mindful of the risks
inherent in regulatory interventions that encourage particular financial innovations and discourage others, the policy analysis suggests that such interventions
may nonetheless be warranted in order to facilitate the effective functioning of
the market forces upon which we have traditionally relied to produce a stable
and efficient system for allocating capital. It also draws attention to the myriad
ways that regulators may implement such policies without mandating or banning the use of any particular transaction structure.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of systemic
risk and its regulation, describing traditional approaches and the new challenges facing regulators. It briefly describes some of the key policy responses
to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, and it situates the case study that follows
within current debates about the regulation of systemic risk. Part II provides a
descriptive account of how MBS and CDO transactions came to be and how
they work. Securitization is not a recent financial innovation and a number of
legal scholars have provided rich accounts of the role of securitization in modern finance and associated legal issues.9 This account complements the existing
literature by taking a different approach to the subject. It focuses on the ways
securitization transactions backed by home loans evolved and spread in response to market and other forces. Part II also introduces the notion of a fragmentation node and identifies aspects of securitized transaction structures that
make them complex.
9. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 1061 (1996); Edward M. Iacobucci & Ralph A. Winter, Asset Securitization
and Asymmetric Information, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 161 (2005); Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1553 (2008); Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor’s Perspective, 76 TEX. L. REV. 595 (1998); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, 41
CONN. L. REV. 1313 (2009); Steven L. Schwarcz, Stanley A. Starr Professor of Law & Bus.,
Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, Keynote Address: Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, at
the South Carolina Law Review Symposium: 1.9 Kids and a Foreclosure: Subprime Mortgages, the Credit Crisis, and Restoring the American Dream (Oct. 24, 2008), in 60 S.C. L.
REV. 549 (2009); Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373 (2008).
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Part III examines the two phenomena arising from the proliferation of
fragmentation nodes that contribute to systemic risk—information loss and
stickiness. This Part shows how the complexity of fragmentation nodes gives
rise to each; it considers how each phenomenon may, in general, give rise to
systemic risk; and, it examines evidence of each arising and creating problems
in the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Part IV sets forth the Article’s   normative  
claim that, because complexity arising from the spread of financial innovations
may contribute to systemic risk, it is an issue about which financial regulators
should be concerned. This Part proposes specific regulations that might have
been reasonable for regulators to implement prior to the 2007-2009 financial
crisis had they been attuned to the dynamics highlighted here and it explains
why similar modes of intervention may be warranted in the years ahead.
I. REGULATING SYSTEMIC RISK
Systemic  risk  may  be  understood  as  “the  risk  that  the  financial  system  will  
fail to function properly because of widespread   distress.”10 It has long been
recognized that a failure in the functioning of the financial system imposes significant externalities, adversely affecting persons far removed from the financial institutions at the core of the crisis.11 The long and deep recession that
arose out of the 2007-2009 financial crisis served as a powerful reminder of
these externalities and hence the value of regulations that reduce systemic
risk.12 The crisis also revealed significant shortcomings in traditional approaches to regulating systemic risk. This Part examines the notion of systemic
risk and evolving approaches to its regulation. It concludes by situating the case
study that follows within current debates about systemic risk regulation.

10. Jean Helwege, Financial Firm Bankruptcy and Systemic Risk, REG., Summer
2009, at 24, 24; see also Hal S. Scott, Reducing Systemic Risk Through the Reform of Capital Regulation, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 763, 763-64  (2010)  (explaining  that  “[s]ystemic risk can
be defined in many ways,”   including,   “[m]ost broadly, . . . the risk that a national, or the
global, financial  system  will  break  down”).
11. CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 224-25 (2009) (providing empirical data on the high costs
of financial crises); see also MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER, ANDREW CROCKETT, CHARLES
GOODHART, AVINASH D. PERSAUD & HYUN SONG SHIN, THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
FINANCIAL REGULATION, 11 GENEVA REPORTS ON THE WORLD ECONOMY, at xvii (2009) [hereinafter BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES] (“It is perhaps banal by now to
point out that the reason why we try to prevent banking crises is that the costs to society are
invariably enormous and exceed the private cost to individual financial institutions.”).  
12. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND
THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION, at xii (2009); Phillip Swagel, The Cost of the Financial Crisis: The Impact of the September 2008 Economic Collapse (Pew Fin. Reform Project, Briefing
Paper
No.
18,
2010),
available
at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Economic_Mobility/Cos
t-of-the-Crisis-final.pdf.
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A. Traditional approaches
Many sources of systemic risk are well known, and tools designed to address those sources of systemic risk are well established. Historically, the paradigmatic source of systemic risk was a banking crisis.13 This is because of the
central role banks play in moving capital from savers to productive undertakings and because of instability inherent in their structure. Banks tend to use
short-term liabilities, like demand deposits, to fund long-term assets, like loans
to small businesses, so even a solvent bank may lack the requisite funds if too
many depositors demand their money back at the same time.14 And because of
the interconnectedness of banks and the potential for problems at one bank to
signal problems at others, a run on one bank can lead to the failure of other
banks and an overall contraction of the financial system. The potential for bank
failures to result in a financial crisis is particularly great when there is a high
degree of correlation in the risks to which banks are exposed, which increases
the likelihood of numerous banks failing within a short period.15
Because bank failures were a primary source of systemic risk, many regulations designed to reduce systemic risk applied solely to banks, as traditionally
defined, and sought to reduce systemic risk by reducing the likelihood that any
individual bank would fail.16 Capital adequacy requirements, which require
each bank to hold a set amount of equity capital, usually established by reference to the size and riskiness of a bank’s  assets,  are  a  classic  form  of  systemic  
risk regulation. They reduce the likelihood of a financial crisis by increasing
the ability of banks to withstand losses regardless of their source.17
As the cornerstone of efforts to reduce systemic risk, capital adequacy requirements also illustrate many of the challenges inherent in this endeavor. One
drawback is that such regulations can impose significant costs. Requiring a
bank to fund itself in a particular manner irrespective  of  the  bank’s  preferences  
reduces the rate at which the bank puts capital to productive uses and has other

13. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO.  L.J.  193,  199  (2008)  (  “The  classic  
example of systemic risk in  this  context  is  a  ‘bank  run’  .  .  .  .”).
14. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 401-02 (1983) (describing this phenomenon and why it may
also therefore be rational for a depositor to demand his money back even if he believes his
bank to be solvent if he expects other depositors in that bank to demand a return of their
funds).
15. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya, Lasse H. Pedersen, Thomas Philippon & Matthew
Richardson, Measuring Systemic Risk 3 (May 2010) (working paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573171.
16. See, e.g., BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, at 7 (
“Regulation has been excessively focussed on seeking to improve the behaviour and risk
management practices of individual banks .  .  .  .”).    
17. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 10, at 764.
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social costs.18 A related issue is that these regulations do not, and are not designed to, eliminate the targeted source of systemic risk completely.19 Because
higher capital adequacy requirements simultaneously reduce the likelihood of
bank failure and increase the social cost of the regulation, the aim of regulators
is not to set requirements so high as to prevent any risk of a bank failure. Rather, their aim is to find a reasonable balance between these countervailing interests. This challenge is accentuated by the apples-to-oranges nature of the
comparison, as the cost of restricting the flow of capital in ways that limit economic growth when times are good is not easily measured and compared with
the risk of a fundamental breakdown in the system through which that capital
flows.20
B. Systemic risk and its regulation today
While bank failures remain an important source of systemic risk, changes
in the roles played by banks and other financial institutions, greater integration
between banks and capital markets in the process of financial intermediation,
and other transformative developments in the capital markets have created an
environment in which the potential sources of systemic risk have become far
more numerous and diverse.21 Among the most significant changes has been
the dramatic growth of the shadow banking system, which not only enables the
capital markets to provide services and products traditionally provided by
banks but also changes the roles played by banks in the process of financial intermediation.22
At   the   same   time,   the   notion   of   what   constitutes   a   “systemic   risk”   has  
broadened. Geoffrey Miller and Gerald Rosenfeld, for example, have recently
drawn  attention  to  “intellectual  hazard,”  that  is,  “the  tendency  of  behavioral  biases to interfere with accurate thought and analysis within complex organiza-

18. See, e.g., RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL
THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY 174-75 (2010); Scott, supra note 10 at 773-74; see also
infra Part I.B.
19. See, e.g., BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, at xviii
(acknowledging  that  “we cannot hope to prevent crises completely”)..
20. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 10, at 773-74  (describing  “the difficult challenges facing regulators attempting to specify the appropriate amount of capital for a given quantum of
risk”).
21. See Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 200  (“Although  a  chain  of  bank  failures  remains  
an important symbol of systemic risk, [as a result of] the ongoing trend towards disintermediation . . . capital markets themselves are increasingly central to any examination of systemic
risk.”).
22. See, e.g., Acharya et al., Tail Risk, supra note 7, at 258-59; Tobias Adrian & Hyun
Song Shin, Money, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy, 99 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC.
600, 601 figs. 1, 2, 3 & 4 (2009); Gorton & Metrick, supra note 3, at 261, 269; Gerding, supra note 3, at 4-5.
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tions,”  as  a  source  of  systemic  risk.23 They explain that “[b]ecause  [intellectual  
hazard] affects organizations that are large, interconnected, or linked to many
other  similarly  situated  organizations,” and it  “poses  a  threat  to  the  smooth,  orderly, and efficient functioning of the world’s financial markets,”   intellectual  
hazard is appropriately characterized as a systemic risk and one that regulators
should seek to address.24 Other academics have shown a similar willingness to
apply the term “systemic risk” to a variety of phenomena, so long as they increase the probability or potential magnitude of a financial crisis.25
Simultaneous with this recognition of the diverse range of the potential
sources of systemic risk has been an evolution in thinking about how best to
reduce systemic risk. A core flaw in traditional approaches to systemic risk
regulation revealed by the 2007-2009 financial crisis is the almost exclusive
focus on trying to maintain the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions. As explained by a group of leading economists:
[The current approach to systemic regulation] implicitly assumes that we can
make the system as a whole safe by simply trying to make sure that individual
banks are safe. This sounds like a truism, but in practice it represents a fallacy
of composition. In trying to make themselves safer, banks, and other highly
leveraged financial intermediaries, can behave in a way that collectively undermines the system.26

This insight has led many academics and policymakers to recognize that in addition  to  “microprudential”  regulations  focused  on  individual institutions, regulatory  efforts  to   manage  systemic  risk  must  also  take  a  “macroprudential”  approach focused on maintaining the stability of the financial system as a
whole.27
Others have been even more critical in their assessments of capital adequacy requirements and of other efforts to reduce systemic risk by imposing costly
new restrictions on banks and other regulated financial institutions. Steven
Schwarcz has described regulatory responses which “focus  on  banks,  not  markets”   as   “anachronistic.”28 In   his   view,   because   of   “new   trends   in   the   global  
23. Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 807, 810 (2010).
24. Id. at 812-13; see id. at 835.
25. See, e.g., Amir E. Khandani, Andrew W. Lo & Robert C. Merton, Systemic Risk
and the Refinancing Ratchet Effect 2-3 (Nat’l   Bureau   of   Econ.   Research,   Working   Paper  
15362,   2009)   (identifying   the   “ratchet   effect,”   whereby   it   is   easier   for   homeowners   to   increase than decrease the amount of leverage in their homes, as a significant source of systemic risk). See generally Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 197 (showing how definitions of systemic  risk  “are inconsistent in several ways”   and  noting  that  “[t]he only common factor in
these definitions is that a trigger event causes a chain of bad economic consequences”).
26. BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, at xvii.
27. See, e.g., Beverly Hirtle, Til Schuermann & Kevin Stiroh, Macroprudential Supervision of Financial Institutions: Lessons from the SCAP 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff
Report No. 409, 2009).
28. Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 374.
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marketplace,”   which   “enable[]   companies   to   access   the   ultimate   source   of  
funds, the capital markets, without going through banks or other financial intermediaries[, a]n exclusive bank-focused approach simply does not keep up
with  underlying  changes  in  the  financial  system.”29
Economist Gary Gorton goes further in his critique of capital adequacy requirements. Gorton draws attention to the potential for the shadow banking system to provide close substitutes for products and services traditionally provided
by banks and competition from foreign banks. In light of these alternatives, he
argues  that  once  the  market  “determine[s]  the  capital  ratio  [which banks should
maintain, any] regulatory increase above this level will result in a decline in the
size  of  the  official  banking  system.”30 In his view, enforcing capital adequacy
requirements will result in less capital flowing through regulated banks and
more capital flowing through alternatives, like the shadow banking system. According   to   Gorton,   “[t]he   same   argument   about   the   uselessness   of   capital   requirements applies to any restriction imposed on banks . . . where entry is not
limited.”31
Even if one believes that capital adequacy requirements and other efforts to
restrict risk taking by financial institutions should continue to play a central
role in limiting systemic risk, these critiques draw attention to an important, unintended consequence of such regulations. By making it more costly for banks
and other regulated financial institutions to extend and hold loans, regulations
that target banks increase the potential economic gains from financial innovations that enable financing activities traditionally performed by banks to move
into markets or other less regulated domains.
A number of academics have drawn attention to this risk and have proposed some creative ways to try to minimize the regulatory discrepancy.32
Nonetheless, significant work remains to be done on the issues that arise as financing and other activities shift out of banks and into the capital markets. This
issue is all the more pressing in light of the policy reforms that have been
adopted in recent years.

29. Id. at 374-75.
30. GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007, at 168

(2010).
31. Id. at 169.
32. See, e.g., John Geanakoplos, Solving the Present Crisis and Managing the Leve-

rage Cycle, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV., Aug. 2010, at 101, 104 (arguing that
“the  best way to monitor leverage is to do it at the security level by keeping track of haircuts
on all the different kinds of assets used as collateral, including in the repo market and in the
housing  market”);;  Gorton  &  Metrick,  supra note 3, at 284-89 (arguing  that  “[r]epos and securitization should be regulated because they are, in effect, new forms of banking, but with
the same vulnerability as other forms of bank-created money”  and  proposing specific ways
of doing so).
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C. Policy responses to the 2007-2009 financial crisis
The Dodd-Frank Act and other policy responses to the 2007-2009 financial
crisis impose a mix of reforms designed to reduce systemic risk. The majority
of the reforms adopted involve increases in the stringency or scope of established tools for regulating systemic risk. Increases in the magnitude of capital
adequacy requirements and other changes intended to increase their efficacy are
a centerpiece in these reforms.33 As a result, there is reason to expect that the
shadow banking system and financial innovations that enable funding activities
to be moved from banks into the capital markets will continue to grow.
At the same time, aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act and other policy responses to the crisis are responsive to concerns about the limitations of traditional approaches to regulating systemic risk and the need for a more macroprudential approach to systemic risk regulation. Specific provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act directly target the structure of certain markets in ways designed to reduce systemic risk.34 Moreover, the Dodd-Frank Act creates a new
Financial Stability Oversight Council (the Council), which will consist of the
heads of the leading financial regulators, as well as a new Office of Financial
Research. These new bodies are specifically charged with identifying and
working with other financial regulators to respond to new sources of systemic
risk. Likewise, at the international level, aspects of the new Basel III framework for banking regulation are expressly designed to address macroprudential
concerns, and a new Financial Stability Board has been formed to work with
“national financial authorities and international standard setting bodies” to
identify and respond to sources of systemic risk arising from markets, in addition to risks arising within large financial intuitions.35
33. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 171, 124 Stat. 1376, 1435-38 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5371) (requiring the appropriate federal banking agencies to establish minimum risk-based capital requirements and providing guidance as to how those standards should be established and implemented); BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 2 (rev. 2011), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf (“The  Basel Committee is raising the resilience of the
banking sector by . . . rais[ing] both the quality and quantity of the regulatory capital base
and enhanc[ing] the risk coverage of the capital framework.”).
34. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act tit. 7, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641-1802 (codified in scattered
sections of 7 and 15 U.S.C. and at 11 U.S.C. § 761 and 12 U.S.C. §§ 4421 and 4422) (imposing new restrictions on swap transactions).
35. About
the
FSB:
Overview,
FIN.
STABILITY
BD.,
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/overview.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2011); see
About
the
FSB:
Mandate,
FIN.
STABILITY
BD.,
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/mandate.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2011); About
the
FSB:
History,
FIN.
STABILITY
BD.,
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/history.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2011); see also Jaime  Caruana,  Gen.  Manager,  Bank  for  Int’l  Settlements,  The Challenge of Taking Macroprudential Decisions: Who Will Press Which Button(s)?, Speech at the 13th Annual International
Banking
Conference
(Sept.
24,
2010),
available
at
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As reflected in the important roles assigned to the Council, the Dodd-Frank
Act serves more as a starting point than a conclusion in efforts to reduce systemic risk.36 Success of the responses adopted thus far depends crucially on the
willingness of the new and newly empowered regulators to use their authority
to effectively address the myriad sources of systemic risk that were not addressed directly, and may even be aggravated, by the other policy reforms
adopted.
The three projects just described—identifying new sources of systemic
risk, developing a macroprudential approach to systemic risk regulation, and
understanding the effects of shifting financing activities out of regulated banks
and into the capital markets—shape the case study that follows. It takes as its
focus the complexity which resulted from the evolution and proliferation of a
particular financial innovation and the ways the resultant complexity gave rise
to two new sources of systemic risk. Underlying this focus is the expectation
that financial innovation will continue and that the spread of financial innovations will often increase the complexity of the capital markets in ways akin to
the sources of complexity which arose from the spread of MBSs and CDOs.
This Article’s   key contributions arise not just from its focus but also its
methodology. By approaching these issues through a case study that begins
with the origins of the financial innovation, the descriptive account that follows
recreates the landscape as it would have appeared to regulators and market participants involved in this area. It thereby sets the stage for a pragmatic analysis
of the sources of systemic risk that may have been visible to regulators (had
they known what they were looking for) and the steps that regulators could
have taken to address those sources of risk prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis.37
II. THE EMERGENCE OF FRAGMENTATION NODES
This Part introduces the subject of the case study—the CDO backed by
MBSs. The descriptive account that follows shows that this highly complex financial innovation was not something that anyone set out to create. Rather, it
evolved over time through a series of incremental steps. This Part also examines the nature of the complexity inherent in these innovative structures.
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100928.pdf (describing the ways Basel III seeks to address
concerns about macroprudential regulation).
36. See, e.g., DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, ENACTED INTO LAW ON JULY 21, 2010, at
i (2010), available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-413bb870-b7c025ed2ecf/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1d4495c7-0be0-4e9a-ba77f786fb90464a/070910_Financial_Reform_Summary.pdf (stating that “[b]y our count, the
[Dodd-Frank] Act requires 243 rulemakings and 67 studies”).
37. We will return in Part IV, below, to examine more closely the questions of how
broadly the findings of this case study may be applied and the likelihood that the dynamics
revealed will arise again.
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A. Mortgage-backed securities
1. The early days
The story of the current mortgage marketplace starts not with private banks
but with the federal government.38 One of the many policy goals pursued by
the government in the wake of the Great Depression to improve the lives of average Americans was to increase homeownership.39 Government programs,
such as government guarantees of certain home loans, increased the willingness
of banks to extend home loans, but many banks remained hesitant to become
overly engaged in the business of making home loans. A primary reason was
the risk that a homeowner would prepay his home loan, either to move or because he had refinanced. As a result of this prepayment risk, the cash flows
from a single home loan can vary dramatically, even if the principal is insured.
Prepayment risk tends to be particularly troublesome for a holder of loans
which have a fixed interest rate, as homeowners are most likely to refinance,
and thereby repay such loans, when interest rates are low—precisely the circumstances when the holder least wants the loans to be repaid.
The government responded by continuing to explore new ways to encourage banks to make home loans. One of the most successful government programs, which grew and evolved over time, was the creation of governmentsponsored entities Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae, which are authorized to acquire home loans and securitize them.40 The process of securitizing a
home loan entails the creation of a securitization vehicle, generally a trust, to
which the GSE sells a pool of home loans that it has acquired from various
banks engaged in the business of originating home loans. The trust obtains the
cash to acquire the home loans by simultaneously issuing securities with certain
rights to the cash flows coming from the underlying loans.41 When a GSE
sponsors a securitization, that GSE guarantees the principal on each of the

38. See 1 TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL
ASSETS POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 49 (Ann Taylor Schwing ed., 2d ed. 2005).
39. See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2185, 2194-97  (2007)  (stating  that  “[t]hroughout  the  1930s  the  federal  government  took  
a series of steps to restart and expand [the mortgage finance and housing construction] industries”  and  describing  each  of  these  initiatives).  
40. While limited secondary markets for mortgages had developed as early as the thirteenth century, it is generally recognized that the current market for mortgage securities developed in the wake of these government programs. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 38, at 202.
See generally id. at 202-11 (describing the history and evolution of pooling mortgages).
41. While not discussed here, tax and regulatory considerations also play substantial
roles in shaping the structure of securitization vehicles.
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loans underlying the transaction.42 As a result, the MBS investor bears the prepayment risk, but the GSE bears the default risk.43
The first GSE-sponsored securitizations were pass-throughs. A passthrough structure provides each investor holding an MBS issued in the transaction a pro rata share of the interest and principal payments made on each of the
home loans underlying the transaction.44 In terms of securitization structure,
these transactions are relatively simple. The cash flows coming in mirror the
cash flows going out, and each investor holds an equivalent set of rights with
respect to those cash flows. The GSE guarantee adds to the relative simplicity
of the transaction by effectively eliminating the need for an investor to evaluate
the credit risk inherent in the underlying loans and by giving a single entity an
incentive to maximize the value of each loan in the event complications arise.
The insight at the core of securitization is that the party in the best position
to originate a home loan (traditionally, a local bank) may not be in the best position to hold the risks and expected returns on that loan. Separating the two
roles allows each to be played by the party best suited to that role.45 While separating these roles may create value, it also creates a number of logistical challenges. One is the need to ensure that the originating bank remains diligent in
determining whether to extend a particular home loan even when it is not directly exposed to its subsequent performance. The primary legal mechanism
used to address this moral hazard is the purchase agreement, in which the originating bank makes numerous representations and warranties regarding the quality of the home loans being transferred and the processes employed by the bank
in determining whether to extend each of the loans.
A second logistical challenge arising from the separation of origination and
ownership was the need to have someone who could service the home loans. A
home loan traditionally created an ongoing relationship between the bank that
originated the loan and the borrower. It was to the bank that the borrower made
42. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUBSIDIES AND THE HOUSING GSES 9 (2001) (describing  the  way  “Fannie  Mae  and  Freddie  Mac  .  .  .  effectively  provide  a  guarantee of timely
payment  on  MBSs”  they  issue).
43. Investors were still exposed to credit risk in that the GSE sponsoring the transaction may not have been financially capable of fulfilling its guarantee, but it was long assumed, and subsequently confirmed, that the US government would never allow the GSEs to
default. See, e.g., JANET M. TAVAKOLI, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND COLLATERALIZED DEBT
OBLIGATIONS: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN CASH AND SYNTHETIC SECURITIZATION 126-27 (2d ed.
2008).
44. See Frederick C. Dunbar et al., CDOs: Structure, Value and Causation Circa
2007, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION IN THE MARKET MELTDOWN ERA: ACHIEVING FAIRNESS IN
PERCEPTION AND REALITY 119, 123 (Practising Law Inst., Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Ser., PLI Order No. 18567, 1990); Brent J. Horton, In Defense of Private-Label
Mortgage-Backed Securities, 61 FLA. L. REV. 827, 836 n.45 (2009).
45. This is just one source of value creation arising from securitization. Another is diversification. Grouping together a pool of home loans reduces the cash-flow variability, and
may  also  be  used  to  reduce,  through  diversification,  the  holder’s  exposure  to  other  risk  factors, such as conditions specific to a geographic region.
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his monthly payments, it was to the bank the borrower turned in the event of
changed circumstances that might require the terms of the loans to be revisited,
and it was the bank that would foreclose and resell the home if the borrower
defaulted. In order to meet this challenge,  securitization  vehicles  retain  a  “servicer,”   a   party   that   specializes   in   servicing   home   loans,   charged   with   these  
tasks.46
GSE-sponsored pass-throughs were an important advance in the mortgage
market and remain a central fixture in that market today.47 They provided a
new option for investors and expanded dramatically the types of investors from
whom capital for home loans could be obtained. Financial intermediaries recognized, however, that the market for mortgage securities could yet be expanded. One way financial intermediaries sought to expand the market was to
increase the pool of investors to whom mortgage securities could be sold.48 Because of prepayment risk, the stream of cash flows from a GSE pass-through
could vary dramatically, making them ill-suited for many investors. If financial
intermediaries could create securities offering more predictable cash flows and
accommodate other needs of heterogeneous investors, the range of investors to
whom mortgage securities could be sold could be increased dramatically. One
response was the formation of securitization transactions backed by pools of
GSE pass-throughs, rather than home loans, against which multiple tranches of
securities were issued.49 Each tranche was given a different set of rights to the
cash flows from the underlying pass-throughs.
A second way financial intermediaries sought to meet the needs of diverse
investors and to expand the market for mortgage securities was to increase the
range of home loans that could be securitized. GSEs can only acquire and securitize loans that meet a number of criteria, including limitations on the duration
of the loan, the ratio of the amount of the loan relative to the value of the home,
and the absolute amount of the loan. Loans that do not meet all of these criteria,
46. Core to making these transactions work is the fact that investors have rights to the
cash flows coming from the mortgages but no direct stake in the mortgages themselves. This
is critical because there are special limitations placed upon the ways in which real property
interests may be divided and special policy issues that arise when interests in real property
become too fragmented or are divided in nonstandardized ways. See, e.g., MICHAEL HELLER,
THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS
INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1
(2000).
47. TAVAKOLI, supra note 43, at 126-28.
48. While under the idealized conditions postulated by Modigliani and Miller, this
type of development would not have produced any net benefits, the reality of the financial
marketplace strays far from that idealized world. E.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Essay, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital
Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 247-51 (2008).
49. These transactions are generally referred to as collateralized mortgage obligations
and continue to have a significant place in the market for mortgage securities. E.g., Dunbar
et al., supra note 44, at 123.
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such as jumbo loans which are greater in amount than those a GSE is allowed
to acquire, could not be sold to a GSE. In response, financial intermediaries
created private-label MBSs, privately sponsored MBS transactions backed by
home loans that do not conform to the GSE criteria.
2. Private-label MBS
The first private-label MBS was issued by Bank of America in 1977. The
federal government enacted legislation facilitating the issuance of private-label
MBSs in 1984 and the market for these securities expanded rapidly thereafter.50
Because home loans packaged into a private-label MBS are not guaranteed by a
GSE, private-label MBSs pose credit risk in addition to prepayment risk. This
was in some ways a significant development, giving rise to the need for the
terms of the MBS to allocate credit risk in addition to prepayment risk. Yet, the
magnitude of this credit risk was perceived to be small, both because of homeowner reluctance to default and the expectation that a significant portion of the
value of a loan could be recovered through foreclosure even if a homeowner
did default.
Both credit risk and prepayment risk are allocated among the different
tranches of MBS issued through waterfall provisions which set forth the rights
of each of the different tranches. The general idea is to create a hierarchical
structure in which losses on the underlying loans are allocated first to the subordinate tranches. This enables the creation of senior tranches which have very
little credit risk. The processes through which these structures are created are
not, however, as simple as the rationale for them.
While the terms of a securitization are static, the cash flows coming into a
securitization vehicle are not. Each time a borrower misses a monthly payment,
makes a double payment to accelerate the rate at which she pays down her loan,
refinances or defaults, the amount of cash coming into the securitization vehicle
is affected. How these events influence the cash paid out of the securitization
vehicle to the various tranches depends upon the terms of that particular transaction. These are just a few of the series of decisions the financial intermediary
sponsoring an MBS must make at the time the transaction is put together. The
sponsor must also decide what home loans to include in the MBS, the terms on
which those loans will be acquired from the originator(s), how many different
tranches of MBSs to issue, the size of each of those tranches, the interest rate
that should be paid to each of those tranches, and so on. There is no cookie cutter that may be used to create these transactions.

50. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act (SMMEA) of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (1984); see also Edward L. Pittman, Economic and Regulatory Developments Affecting Mortgage Related Securities, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 497, 497 (1989)
(explaining that the changes effectuated by SMMEA and noting that following its adoption,
“the  market  for  mortgage  securities  .  .  .  increased  dramatically”).  
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The range of options available to a financial intermediary sponsoring an
MBS transaction is reflected in the variety of different mechanisms a sponsor
may use to credit enhance the senior tranches issued by that MBS. As just described, the primary means of credit enhancement is the use of a multi-tranche,
subordination structure. Typically, all of the losses on the underlying home
loans are allocated first to the most junior or equity tranche, which for this reason is often referred   to   as   the   “first-loss”   piece. If and when that tranche is
wiped out, the second most junior tranche begins absorbing the losses, and the
pattern repeats as needed.51 While this type of rule is regularly used to allocate
losses, there is no comparable uniform rule that must be used to allocate principal payments among the different tranches.
If a sponsor wants to minimize the credit risk to which the senior tranche is
exposed, the sponsor can use a sequential amortization scheme. In that case,
100% of the principal payments made on any of the underlying loans, including
prepayments, are paid out to the most senior tranche of MBS outstanding until
that tranche is repaid in full. At that time, the process repeats with all principal
repaid going to the most senior tranche still outstanding. While such an approach minimizes credit risk, there are also drawbacks to using a strictly sequential waterfall. Because the rate at which the senior tranche will be repaid
increases as prepayments increase, this type of waterfall exposes the senior
tranche to significant prepayment risk. The terms of the more junior tranches of
MBS that result from this type of structure also may not be well-suited to the
needs of investors otherwise in a position to bear the additional credit risk
posed by those tranches. Thus, while many MBS transactions continued to use
this type of waterfall, financial intermediaries also experimented with an array
of other mechanisms for distributing principal payments.52
The waterfall provisions may, for example, provide that the most senior
tranche receives all of the principal payments until the earlier of a specified
point in time, e.g., five years from the date of issuance, or the satisfaction of
specified performance metrics. Once the enumerated condition is satisfied, the
principal ceases to be distributed sequentially and is instead distributed pro rata
among all of the tranches of MBSs still outstanding, based upon the principal
value of the MBSs.53 The performance metrics are designed to ensure that the
amount of credit enhancement in the securitization vehicle makes it probable
that the shift to the pro rata allocation of principal will not expose the senior

51. The junior tranches are compensated for the additional credit risk to which they are
exposed through a higher interest rate.
52. E.g., FRANKEL, supra note 38, at 365 (describing pay-through MBS structures designed  to  offer  “planned  amortization  class  bonds”  and  “targeted  amortization  class  bonds”).
53. E.g., Gary B. Gorton, The Subprime Panic 10 (Nat’l   Bureau   of   Econ.   Research,  
Working Paper No. 14398, 2008).
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tranches to too much credit risk.54 In addition to being used as a trigger for
shifting from a sequential to a pro rata amortization scheme, different performance metrics—ones indicating that the loans underlying a transaction are performing below expectations—may be used to cut off interest payments to subordinate tranches even before the aggregate losses have wiped out those
tranches.
In addition to determining the bundle of cash-flow rights which should be
given to each of the tranches, a transaction sponsor may also create tranches
with rights that fall outside this prioritized hierarchy. Common alternatives include interest-only and principal-only tranches, which have terms consistent
with their names. By parsing more finely the type of risk to which the holder is
exposed, these types of MBSs may be used by investors as hedges against other
risks to which they may be exposed or to bet upon market movements.55 Interest-only MBSs, for example, generally have no credit risk but substantial prepayment risk, so may be attractive to an investor who believes that interest rates
are likely to increase and thus that prepayment speeds will be slower than the
market anticipates (assuming that the loans underlying the transaction have
fixed, rather than variable, interest rates).56
In conjunction with the structures described above, a variety of additional
mechanisms may be used to provide further credit enhancement to the senior
tranches. Some of these mechanisms are external to the securitization vehicle,
such as a letter of credit, guarantee or insurance covering a portion of the MBSs
issued.57 For example, it became common prior to the financial crisis for all or
a portion of the AAA-rated securities issued in a transaction to be insured by a
AAA-rated insurance company.58 So long as the amount paid for this insurance
policy was less than the savings realized in the form of the lower interest rate
that could be paid on the MBSs protected by the insurance, these policies made
economic sense from the perspective of the transaction sponsor.
Other mechanisms for providing credit enhancement are endogenous to the
securitization vehicle. The two most commonly used mechanisms are excess
spread and overcollateralization.59 Excess spread arises when the cash flows
54. These metrics may include limitations on the aggregate value of defaults on the
underlying pool of mortgages and the proportion of outstanding loans that are delinquent as
of the measurement date. E.g., id. at 10.
55. FRANKEL, supra note 38, at 367 (describing securitization structures providing for
interest-only and principal-only securities, and noting the ways each may be used to hedge
different interest rate risks).
56. E.g., REDWOOD TRUST, THE REDWOOD REVIEW 2ND QUARTER 2009, at 43 (2009)
(describing a particular interest-only MBS investment, including risks and expected returns).
57. See generally FRANKEL, supra note 38, 360-70.
58. E.g., Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57
UCLA L. REV. 183, 201 (2009).
59. E.g., Gary Gorton & Nicholas S. Souleles, Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization, in THE RISKS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 549, 564 (Mark Carey & René M. Stulz,
eds., 2006).
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paid out of a securitization vehicle, including fees and interest payments to
MBS holders, are less than the amount of cash coming into the securitization
vehicle from the underlying home loans (excluding, in both directions, cash
flows characterized as principal).60 Overcollateralization arises when the face
value of the assets (the underlying home loans) in a securitization vehicle exceed the face value of the MBS securities issued by that vehicle.61
As this abbreviated introduction to MBS structures reflects, innovation
within the field of mortgage securitization provided transaction sponsors with
an almost endless array of spigots they could use in constructing the waterfall
which determines when cash from the underlying home loans is paid out to
each of the tranches of securities issued. By allowing transaction sponsors to
partition risk more finely, and package that risk in different forms, these innovations enabled sponsors to create securities particularly suited to meet the individualized need of different investors. At the same time, the use of multitranche structures and other credit enhancement mechanisms increased the
complexity of securitization structures and transformed the relationship between the investor and the assets underlying its investment. In contrast to a
pass-through, the economic interest of an MBS investor in a loan underlying
his investment is not fixed but rather is dynamic and contingent upon the performance of the other loans with which that loan is bundled and the waterfall
pursuant to which the cash flows from the loans are allocated among the various tranches.
To highlight that something new is created which permanently transforms
the relationship between the underlying asset and the investors with economic
rights to the cash flows from that   asset,   this  article  introduces   the  term   “fragmentation   node”   for   the   structure   that   is   formed.62 The term is a theoretical
construct for the rights, responsibilities and constraints set forth in all of the
agreements entered into when a multi-tranche securitization transaction is consummated. It applies to all private-label MBS and to the collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction structures described below.
Notably, once a fragmentation node is put into place, it cannot be removed.
As a result, a home loan, which started as a bilateral arrangement between two
parties, becomes embedded in a complex web of arrangements which may
grant tens, or even hundreds, of investors an economic stake in that loan. By
shifting attention away from the securitization transaction which creates these
varied interests toward the landscape of the capital market post-transaction, the
60. Id.
61. GORTON, supra note 30, at 98-99; Gorton & Souleles, supra note 59, at 560.
62. The term node has also been used in the growing body of literature examining

network effects which is starting to be applied to financial networks. The use of the term
here complements but is analytically distinct from its use in that literature, as the qualifier
fragmentation draws attention to what happens inside the node. See, e.g., Ross A. Hammond,
Systemic Risk in the Financial System: Insights from Network Science 2 (Pew Fin. Reform
Project, Briefing Paper No. 12, 2009).
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term fragmentation node facilitates consideration of the systemic consequences
associated with their proliferation. In light of the possibility for transactions in
the aggregate to have systemic effects which are qualitatively different than the
localized effects of any individual transaction, the ability to shift between these
two modes of analyzing this financial innovation is critical to developing a
more complete understanding of the ramifications of its spread.
B. Toward more complex structures
This Part describes some of the innovations and market forces which
shaped the growth of the mortgage security market in the years leading up to
the financial crisis. It explains why a particular type of MBS, subprime MBS,
and CDOs backed by MBSs proliferated rapidly during this period and it describes key features of these transaction structures.
1. Another type of innovation
The preceding Part described myriad innovations enabling transaction
sponsors to modify the terms of a securitization transaction to better suit investor needs and to enable a broader array of home loan types to be packaged into
fragmentation nodes. At the same time, another type of innovation was simultaneously contributing to the growth of the market for mortgage securities. This
group of innovations included new techniques for modeling MBS and related
transactions and the development of other tools which facilitated the ability of
financial intermediaries sponsoring securitization transactions, credit agencies
rating them, and potential investors evaluating them to assess more easily the
expected returns on the securities issued.
For example, one challenge in assessing the value of a security issued in a
multi-tranche securitization transaction is that its value depends not only on the
quality of the underlying assets and the terms of the waterfall, but also on the
correlation among the performance of the underlying assets. If all of the underlying assets are likely to succeed or fail at the same time, the securitization
structure does not enable the type of diversification which is key to reducing
the likelihood that the senior tranche of securities issued will fail to perform.63
A paper published by David Li in 2000 described a device, known as a Gaussian copula, which could be used to reduce dramatically the effort required to
evaluate the relationships among the default risks of the assets in certain securitization transactions.64

63. Dunbar et al., supra note 44, at 137-39.
64. E.g., Felix Salmon, Recipe for Disaster: The Formula That Killed Wall Street,

WIRED MAG. 419 (Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/1703/wp_quant?currentPage=all (explaining that in the years immediately following its publication,  “Li’s  formula,  known  as  a  Gaussian  copula function, looked like an unambiguously
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Li’s  Gaussian  copula  enabled  market  participants  to  use  a  single  number  to  
capture the effect of these relationships among the underlying assets for each
tranche of securities issued in a CDO, subject to certain assumptions and the
availability of relevant data.65 This radically reduces the effort required to evaluate the expected default rate and return on the securities issued. Views differ
on the extent to which market participants understood the limitations inherent
in this device.66 There is little disagreement, however, on how widely used it
became, and how critical its use was in enabling the growth of the MBS and
CDO markets.67 Other similar innovations and improvements in modeling
techniques also played important roles in enabling the creation of even more
complex fragmentation nodes.68
2. Market forces
In light of the myriad mechanisms MBS and CDO sponsors could build into waterfalls and the new tools available to them to assess the expected performance of the various securities issued, the primary factors shaping the growth
of the MBS and subsequently CDO markets became market forces—the types
of home loans available to be securitized and the willingness of investors to acquire the securities issued.
Of these, perhaps the most significant was the strong investor demand for
financial instruments with a AAA rating.69 Because MBSs backed by subprime

positive breakthrough, a piece of financial technology that allowed hugely complex risks to
be modeled with more ease and accuracy than ever before”).
65. E.g., Damiano Brigo, Andrea Pallavicini & Roberto Torresetti, Credit Models and
the Crisis: Default Cluster Dynamics and the Generalized Poisson Loss Model, 6 J. CREDIT
RISK 39 (2010).
66. DAMIANO BRIGO, ANDREA PALLAVICINI & ROBERTO TORRESETTI, CREDIT MODELS
AND THE CRISIS 6 (2010) (stating  that  “quant  and  academic  communities  .  .  .  produced  and  
witnessed   a   large   body   of   research   questioning   the   copula   assumption”   even   prior   to   the  
2007-2009 financial crisis while recognizing that many popular media accounts of the crisis
have suggested otherwise).
67. E.g., Donald MacKenzie, The Credit Crisis as a Problem in the Sociology of
Knowledge, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1778, 1803 (2011) (describing  the  adoption  and  spread  of  Li’s  
Gaussian copula); Sam Jones, Of Couples and Copulas, FIN. TIMES, MAG. Apr. 25, 2009, at
30   (explaining   the   critical   role  played   by   Li’s   Gaussian   copula   in   the   growth   of   structured  
finance  and  how  it  led  to  “CDOs  built  solely  out  of  subprime  mortgage  debt  bec[oming]  the  
rage”);;  Salmon, supra note  64,  at  419  (explaining  that  Li’s  Gaussian  copula  function  “was  
adopted by everybody from bond investors and Wall Street banks to ratings agencies and
regulators,”   enabling   “traders   to   sell   vast   quantities   of   new   securities,   expanding financial
markets  to  unimaginable  levels”).
68. E.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 72 (2011)
(“As  private-label securitization began to take hold, new computer and modeling technologies were reshaping  the  mortgage  market.”).
69. E.g., Buttonwood: Not What They Meant, The Economist, Jan. 30, 2010 at 82 (explaining   how   the   “Basel   rules,   designed   to   ensure   that   banks   have   enough   capital   to   cope  
with economic crises,  …  created  an  incentive  for  banks  to  hold  AAA-rated  securities”);;  Ben
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loans and CDOs backed in part by MBSs tended to offer particularly high
yields relative to their rating, there was a particularly strong demand for these
securities.70 This demand transformed the marketplace, both directly and indirectly, as financial intermediaries sponsoring these transactions became increasingly creative in finding ways to feed this demand.71
One response of financial intermediaries sponsoring these transactions was
to increase the rate at which they acquired loans, particularly subprime loans,
which in turn influenced the rate at which originators extended such loans. Only 6% of the home loans originated in 2002 were subprime, compared with
more than 20% by 2007.72 Of the roughly $1.2 trillion in subprime loans extended in 2005-2006, more than 80% were subsequently packaged into securitization transactions.73 A second, closely related trend was the growth of the
CDO market. As  one  source  noted,  “[a]lthough CDOs have existed since 1987,
the market experienced significant growth during the period 2000 to 2006. In
2004, there was approximately $157.4 billion in global CDO issuance. In 2006,
there was $551.7 billion in issuance, a growth of approximately 250[%].”74
These two trends are closely linked because CDOs were among the primary buyers of MBSs backed by subprime home loans, particularly the lower investment-grade tranches.75 Because these tranches traditionally had been
among the most difficult to sell, this demand led to a feedback loop, with a particularly pronounced effect in the subprime area, in which CDOs and MBSs
transactions proliferated in tandem.76 In light of the importance of subprime
MBSs and CDOs to the market for mortgage securities in the years leading into
the 2007-2009 financial crisis, each is addressed below.

S. Bernanke, Carol Bertaut, Laurie Pounder DeMarco & Steven Kamin, International Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets in the United States, 2003-2007, at 7-13 (Bd. Governors Fed. Reserve Sys., International Finance Discussion Paper No. 1014, 2011).
70. E.g., RAJAN, supra note 18, at 135.
71. E.g., Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 33 (2009); Bernanke et al, supra note 69, at 13-15.
72. Subprime Lending: Rising Damp, ECONOMIST, March 10, 2007 at 69.
73. Gorton, supra note 53, at 6.
74. FATEN SABRY & CHUDOZIE OKONGWU, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, HOW DID
WE GET HERE? THE STORY OF THE CREDIT CRISIS (2009), available at
http://www.nera.com/extImage/PUB_Credit_Crisis_Origins_V_0609.pdf.
75. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 68, at 128-30   (explaining   how   “CDOs  
[became] the dominant buyers of the BBB-rated tranches of mortgage-backed  securities”  and  
the effects of this shift).
76. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, RESPONDING TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND
MEASURING SYSTEMIC RISK 87 (2009); MacKenzie, supra note 67, at 1822-23; Dunbar et al.,
supra note 44, at 126.
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3. Subprime MBS
While the process of constructing an MBS backed by traditional home
loans requires a notable degree of customization, the process becomes significantly more complicated as the complexity of the underlying loans increases. In
part because of the additional credit risk associated with home loans extended
to borrowers with poor credit histories, the defining characteristic of subprime
loans, such loans often have a number of complicating features. Subprime loans
are often structured as hybrid loans, with a low, fixed interest rate for the first
two or three years (a teaser rate), and a higher variable interest rate thereafter.77
As a result, subprime borrowers often have a strong incentive to try to refinance
after only two or three years. The tendency for many subprime home loans to
be refinanced within a few years of origination shaped the terms of the securitization vehicles into which they were packaged. As described by Gary Gorton:
Subprime securitizations are very different from standard securitizations because the refinancing of the underlying subprime mortgages provides the securitization with a lot of cash, which can be used to build-up credit enhancement
over time. It does this by storing cash in the securitization and by amortization, which builds up the lower-rated  tranches’  thickness  over  time.  But,  this  
dynamic credit enhancement depends on the subprime mortgages refinancing.78

Thus, the performance of MBSs backed by subprime loans depends upon the
ability of each homeowner to refinance and prepay in full his current loan. A
homeowner’s  ability  to  do  so  depends,  in  turn,  on  the  value  of  the  home  at  the  
time he seeks to refinance, as well as prevailing credit conditions.79 As a result,
the performance of subprime loans and MBSs backed by subprime loans are
much more sensitive to the housing market than more traditional home loans
and MBSs.
A related effect is that subprime MBSs tend to be far more complex than
other private-label MBSs. Balancing the need to provide the senior tranches
with sufficient credit enhancement to warrant a high rating from a credit rating
agency with the need to provide adequate expected returns to attract buyers to
the more junior tranches, while also creating a structure that can absorb the expected onslaught of early prepayments, requires complicated mechanisms to be
built into the waterfall provisions of each transaction. As a result, the waterfall
provisions of a subprime MBS typically contained myriad triggers, relating to

77. DEP’T OF TREASURY, STATEMENT ON SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LENDING, 72 Fed. Reg.
37569 (July 10, 2007); Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime
Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1076.
78. Gorton, supra note 53, at 12.
79. The likelihood a subprime mortgagor who cannot refinance will default, and the
likelihood that default will result in a loss to the holder of the loan, are also increased by
another common feature of subprime mortgages -- the down payment is often low or nonexistent. E.g., Bar-Gill, supra note 77, at 1076.
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the age of the securitization vehicle, the amount of over-collateralization and
other performance metrics.80
The intricacy of these waterfall provisions highlights the complexity of the
deal struck among the holders of the different tranches of MBS issued regarding the rights of each tranche to cash flows coming from the underlying home
loans. As in other private-label MBSs, the deal struck is not that the holders of
the most senior tranche always win out over the holders of other tranches, no
matter what the cost or effect on those tranches. Rather, the most senior tranche
has priority over the other tranches only to the extent set forth in the terms of
that particular MBS. This finely tuned allocation of rights is key to the success
of securitization, for the protections provided to the more junior tranches are
key to attracting investors willing to acquire those securities.
4. Collateralized debt obligations and beyond
CDOs are securitization transactions, like MBSs, but may be backed by a
range of different debt instruments.81 At issue here are CDOs backed exclusively or in significant part by MBSs. The process of creating such a CDO is
similar to the process of creating an MBS. A securitization vehicle is formed
which acquires cash-producing assets with capital it receives from issuing multiple tranches of securities. Cash flows, in the form of interest and principal
from the underlying assets, come into the securitization vehicle. That cash is
then paid out to investors or retained in the vehicle pursuant to detailed waterfall provisions put into place when the transaction is consummated. Because the
assets underlying a CDO are more diverse and complex than the home loans
underlying an MBS, the process of compiling assets and designing waterfalls to
determine when interest and principal are to be paid to investors is often even
more complex than the process described above. Moreover, just as with MBS
transactions, those terms are customized to each transaction.82

80. See Gorton, supra note 53, at 10-12.
81. E.g., TAVAKOLI, supra note 43, at 117. This paper also takes the position that, for

relevant purposes, CDOs should not be seen as analogous to actively managed financial institutions. The critical distinction—the lack of active management at the level of the node—
is pivotal with respect to each of the phenomenon identified in Part III. Cf. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Martin Oehmke, Complexity in Financial Markets 5 (Sept. 10, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://www.princeton.edu/~markus/research/papers/Complexity.pdf (”If   one   were   to   value  
Goldman  Sachs  ‘bottom-up’,  i.e.  by  considering  each  of  Goldman  Sachs’s  businesses,  their  
positions, projected cash flows and their risk profile, the resulting exercise would likely be at
least as complex as  coming  up  with  a  price  for  the  tranche  of  a  CDO.”).  
82. Gorton, supra note 53,  at  14  (“There  is  no  standardization  of  triggers  across  CDOs.  
Some have sequential cash flow triggers, others do not. Some have [over-collateralization]
trigger calculations based on ratings changes; others do not. There is no straightforward template.”).
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Another important difference between MBSs and CDOs in practice was the
mode of distribution. While many MBSs were distributed through public offerings, CDOs were generally distributed through private placements pursuant to
an exemption which enables the securities issued to be resold even if they have
not been registered pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933.83 One criterion to
qualify for this exemption is that all of the investors to whom the securities are
offered must be qualified institutional buyers (QIBs). QIBs are generally required to have at least $100 million in investable assets.84 As a result, CDO investors were almost exclusively institutional investors with substantial assets
and resources who were presumed under applicable securities laws to be capable of looking out for themselves.
Despite their complexity, CDOs comprised of other securitized assets, like
MBSs, were not the end of the story. Financial intermediaries continued to add
additional fragmentation nodes along the same chain, forming so-called
CDO2s, which included CDO securities among their assets, and even CDO3s.
The main rationale underlying these transactions was the same as that underlying the creation of CDOs—because the price differential between highly rated
structured products and lower-rated structured products was greater than was
justified by differences in their assessed credit risk, transforming lower-rated
securities into higher-rated ones could create value.85
Another major area of innovation was the introduction of hybrid and synthetic CDOs. Synthetic CDOs are backed by a pool of credit default swaps referencing MBSs or other assets, rather than actual cash-producing assets.86 Credit
default swaps are bilateral agreements which require each party to the agreement to make payments to the other depending upon the performance of an
agreed upon reference security. The swaps underlying synthetic CDOs were
designed to mimic the performance of reference MBS or other debt instruments. Because each swap was a bilateral agreement, for a synthetic CDO to
take a long position (effectively betting that home loans would continue to perform), there had to be an investor willing to take the short position (betting that
home loans would underperform relative to market expectations). Synthetic
CDOs, accordingly, served two markets simultaneously. The synthetic CDOs
issued satisfied the market demand for mortgage securities while investors who

83. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2009).
84. Id.; see also William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Birth of Rule 144A Equity Offerings, 56

UCLA L. REV. 409, 426 (2008).
85. A notable flaw in this reasoning is that not all credit risk is equal. Even if a AAArated CDO and a AAA-rated corporate bond have the same expected default rate, the corporate bond poses relatively more idiosyncratic risk and should, accordingly, be more highly
valued by investors who can reduce their exposure to that risk through diversification. E.g.,
Joshua D. Coval, Jakub W. Jurek & Erik Stafford, Economic Catastrophe Bonds, 99 AM.
ECON. REV. 628 (2009).
86. Because synthetic CDOs are not the focus of this paper, what is provided is a simplified and somewhat stylized account of how synthetic CDOs work.
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wanted to short the mortgage market (because they believed that the market
was overpriced or to hedge against other investments they held) could do so by
acting as a counterparty to one or more of the underlying swaps. A related
product, the hybrid CDO, is backed by a combination of cash-producing assets
and credit default swaps. An extensive analysis of the growth of these markets,
and the distinct issues presented by these transactions, is outside the scope of
this article. It suffices to note that each was yet another example of an innovation which built off a framework that had already gained acceptance in the
marketplace.
An example of how the developments just described translated into practice is provided by Kenneth Scott and John Taylor based on their examination
of the details of several CDOs. They found:
One example is a . . . CDO2 created by a large bank in 2005. It had 173 investments in tranches issued by other pools: 130 CDOs, and also 43 [collateralized loan obligations] each composed of hundreds of corporate loans. It issued $975 million of four AAA tranches, and three subordinate tranches of
$55 million. The AAA tranches were bought by banks and the subordinate
tranches mostly by hedge funds. Two of the 173 investments held by this
CDO2 were in tranches from another billion-dollar CDO—created by another
bank earlier in 2005—which was composed mainly of 155 MBS tranches and
40 CDOs. Two of these 155 MBS tranches were from a $1 billion RMBS pool
created in 2004 by a large investment bank, composed of almost 7,000 mortgage loans (90% subprime).87

This example illustrates the extent of fragmentation, the level of complexity inherent in these transactions, and the tendency for each of these effects to
compound with the addition of each serial fragmentation node. The degree of
fragmentation becomes evident by taking the perspective of one of the 7,000
subprime borrowers. His loan was pooled with 7,000 other home loans in a
highly complex MBS structure, which likely used over-collateralization and
other dynamic credit enhancement mechanisms. As a result, the rights of any
MBS holder to the interest and principal that homeowner is paying depends in
part on whether the 7,000 other homeowners are making their payments on
time. Moreover, some of the securities issued in that MBS transaction went
through a second fragmentation node—the billion-dollar CDO created by
another bank earlier in 2005—at which stage, the cash flows from those MBSs
are pooled with cash flows from 154 other MBS tranches and 40 CDOs, and
then allocated according to another complicated waterfall. Then, some of the
securities issued in that transaction went through yet another fragmentation
node—the CDO2 described—at which stage, the cash flows (which still include
payments made by the original subprime homeowner) are pooled with cash
from 130 CDOs and 43 collateralized loan obligations and then allocated
among the various tranches issued in that CDO2 pursuant to yet another com87. Kenneth E. Scott & John B. Taylor, Op-Ed, Why Toxic Assets Are So Hard to
Clean Up, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2009, at A13.
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plicated waterfall. To identify, much less gather together, all of the persons
with an economic stake in that home loan would be a nearly impossible feat. At
the same time, from the perspective of an investor in the CDO2, he has only a
minor stake in the performance of that particular loan and now has layers upon
layers of additional information regarding the structure of the CDO2, the structure of the other securitization vehicles issuing securities packaged into the
CDO2, and the almost countless assets underlying all of those transactions,
which are also relevant to the performance of his investment.
C. A changed landscape
The previous Part provided a brief account of the mortgage securities landscape just prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis and the key market forces
shaping the development of that landscape. This Part completes the account.
Because  the  term  “complexity”  is  often  invoked,  accurately  but  unhelpfully,  to  
describe a wide array of different transactions and effects, developing a more
nuanced understanding of the nature of the complexity at issue is critical to
enabling a meaningful analysis of its effects. The first Subpart does this by
identifying four specific sources of complexity inherent in fragmentation nodes.
The second Subpart considers the processes through which fragmentation
nodes evolved and spread, and the third Subpart acknowledges the many forces
which may have influenced their evolution and proliferation which do not
create value even on a localized basis, complicating the account told thus far.
1. Understanding the complexity
Taking a step back, we can see that additional complexity was introduced
at each of the stages in the evolution of mortgage securities described above.
Four specific sources of complexity inherent in all fragmentation nodes merit
particular attention.
The first is fragmentation. Each of the securitization transactions described
above creates fragmented economic rights with respect to the assets underlying
that securitization. As a result, each MBS or CDO investor generally has only a
small economic stake in the performance of any particular asset underlying that
investment. The magnitude of this reduction compounds with each additional
fragmentation node that is added to the chain connecting the home loan to the
ultimate investor. A simple example illustrates: If the holder of an MBS has a
5% interest in the cash flows coming from a particular loan and that holder is
itself a CDO which grants each of its investors a 5% stake in the cash flows
coming into that CDO securitization vehicle, each CDO investor would have
only a 5% of 5%, or a 0.25%, economic stake in the performance of each underlying loan.
This hypothetical, of course, obscures the effect of having different
tranches. The creation of prioritized claims in the form of tranches, each hold-
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ing a different set of rights with respect to the cash flows coming from the underlying assets, enables the creation of securities with less credit risk than the
assets underlying a securitization transaction. Multi-tranche structures also enable the creation of securities with very specific characteristics. Because of investor heterogeneity, this customization has the potential to increase the efficiency of the capital markets and lower the cost of capital to those in need of it.
At the same time, by giving different investors different sets of rights, these
structures give rise to a variety of challenges.
Hence, a second source of complexity, arising from multi-tranche structures, is the dynamic and contingent nature of the economic interest held by a
MBS or CDO investor with respect to the performance of any particular asset
underlying its investment. Because of credit enhancement, the nonperformance
of an underlying asset, be it a mortgage or MBS, may have no effect on the
cash flows paid to holders of a senior tranche issued in a securitization. The
amount of credit enhancement supporting that senior tranche will decrease each
time an asset fails to perform in accordance with its terms, but whether that
failure adversely affects the cash paid to holders of that senior tranche depends
upon the performance of the other assets underlying that transaction.
A third, closely related source of complexity is the creation of divergent,
and potentially competitive, economic interests with respect to the performance
of any particular asset. A latent competitive tendency is inherent in any multitranche structure when the triggers in the waterfall which determine the rights
of each tranche to the cash coming into the securitization vehicle are fixed by
reference to the original terms of the underlying cash-producing assets. When
an asset is placed into such a securitization vehicle, there is no longer one holder with a direct interest in maximizing the value of that asset, or even a group
of holders, each with fractional but equivalent economic stakes; rather, there
are multiple holders, each of which may be differently impacted depending
upon how the terms of the asset are modified. As a result, if a situation arises
which was not contemplated at the time the underlying asset was created, different investors may be expected to have divergent preferences regarding the
appropriate response.
The fourth and final source of complexity is simply the lengthening of the
chain separating the original cash producing asset (the home loan) and the ultimate investor with economic rights to the cash flows coming from that asset.
The addition of serial fragmentation nodes in the chain separating those two
ends may have a particularly pernicious effect on the ability of a person sitting
at one end to see through to or effect changes at the other end as a result of each
of the other sources of complexity just described. But, even without the additional challenges created by fragmentation nodes specifically, the lengthening
of the chain may in itself contribute to reduced visibility and other issues.88
88. See Hu & Black, supra note 6,  at  691  (“The  longer  the  ownership  chain  .  .  .  the  
greater the potential for agency costs and valuation errors  to  creep  in.”).  
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Drawing attention to the specific sources of complexity inherent in fragmentation nodes enables a more precise analysis of the effects of that complexity, including the mechanisms through which it contributes to systemic risk. It
also lays the groundwork for determining whether other financial innovations
identified as complex are likely to produce similar effects, thus meriting the attention of regulators concerned about systemic risk.
2. The process of financial innovation
The preceding descriptive account also provides an overview of the
processes through which fragmentation nodes came to be, evolved in form, and
proliferated. These processes are informative both as they relate to fragmentation nodes and as illustrative of the ways in which financial innovations arise,
evolve and spread more generally. Again, a couple of patterns merit attention.
One is that the growth of complexity occurred along two axes. The first
axis relates to the complexity of the individual transaction structures and the
securities created by those transactions. The second axis relates to the spread of
fragmentation nodes arising from the consummation of those transactions. The
proliferation of fragmentation nodes altered the landscape of the capital markets, increasing its complexity in ways not captured by the heightened complexity of any particular transaction. As a result, as we will explore further in
the next Part, when a financial innovation becomes sufficiently pervasive, the
resultant complexity may have systemic consequences which are qualitatively
different from the localized effects of any individual transaction.
A second pattern revealed in the preceding account is that complexity increased along each of these axes in an incremental fashion. Had a financial intermediary tried to sell the securities issued by the complex CDO2 described by
Scott and Taylor to investors with no familiarity with mortgage securities, it
almost assuredly would not have found any buyers. But the financial intermediary sponsoring that transaction did not create it out of whole cloth—it used
features to which investors had become accustomed incrementally, over time.
Looking back, we can see that financial intermediaries, investors and regulators
became accustomed first to pass-throughs, then simple private-label MBS, then
more complex MBS, then subprime MBS and so on.
The incremental nature of this evolution was key to enabling the complexity that developed. An investor accustomed to investing in pass-throughs presented with a private-label MBS, for example, may not have questioned whether using a servicer could affect the cash flows coming from a mortgage because
the use of such agents was an innovation to which that investor had already become accustomed. Similarly, once that investor became accustomed to investing in private-label MBSs, that investor may have questioned the additional
risks posed by the inclusion of risky mortgages in a subprime MBS, but might
not revisit the question of whether purchase agreements could be relied upon to
ensure mortgage originators had engaged in appropriate due diligence in deter-
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mining whether to extend a loan packaged into an MBS. Nor would such an investor be likely to scrutinize a gradual increase in the number or diversity of
tranches issued in MBS transactions. Similarly, regulators who witness this
evolution may not step back and question whether the evolution and proliferation of a financial innovation might have systemic effects which vary, qualitatively, from the issues associated with any particular incremental innovation or
any individual transaction. In general, there may be a tendency for all involved
to examine closely only the issues raised by the most recent incremental
change.
The incremental nature of the processes through which financial innovations become highly complex is critical to understanding how that complexity
develops and why that complexity itself may not be subjected to close scrutiny
by market participants or regulators. Despite its importance, this issue has been
largely overlooked in other accounts of the 2007-2009 financial crisis or financial crises more generally.89
A final note about the processes through which these innovative transactions spread is the role played by other financial innovations. Li’s  Gaussian  copula and innovations in modeling provided market participants and regulators
with a plausible basis for believing that the complexity, while great, was manageable.90 While the extent of reliance on such tools has been the subject of
heated debates in the wake of the crisis, it is clear that many of these developments were genuinely valuable innovations and it is equally clear that at least
some market participants and regulators believed, to a fault, in the capacity of
such innovations to render the risks inherent in even the most complicated new
financial instrument knowable. In other words, it was not just the incremental
nature of these processes, but also the availability of a story that market participants could tell themselves about why the resultant complexity need not be a
source of concern, that helped enable the complexity which resulted.
3. Other factors shaping these markets
The story presented thus far has taken as a given the heterogeneity of investors, the legitimacy of investor demand for assets with particular characteristics (like a AAA rating), the appropriateness of the steps taken by financial
intermediaries and others involved in these transactions to feed investor demand, and that those intermediaries were feeding, rather than creating, the investor demand. In so doing, this account has largely assumed that these transactions at least appeared to create value on a localized basis when they were
consummated. This Subpart briefly addresses some of the factors which may

89. A related and well-recognized phenomenon is that in assessing the risks of a financial instrument, investors may be overly influenced by recent events. E.g., HYMAN P.
MINSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 110 (2008).
90. E.g., Miller & Rosenfield, supra note 23, at 823.
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have contributed to these transactions spreading even beyond the point that
could be explained by the gap between the localized and systemic effects of
their spread. Consistent with the pragmatic aim of this article to consider what
regulators and others reasonably could have known and what actions they may
have taken prior to the crisis, the hindsight-enabled insight that many of these
transactions did not create real value even on a localized basis is largely delegated to the sidelines for the remainder of this article. 91 Nonetheless, in light of
the important contributory role other forces may have played in leading up to
the crisis, the fact that many of these forces may have been visible to regulators, and the possibility that regulators should be mindful of these forces in assessing the benefits and risks associated with the spread of other financial innovations, some of these forces merit mention.
a.

Regulation

Among the key drivers of financial innovation generally are efforts to reduce the cost of regulatory compliance.92 Often  referred  to  as  “regulatory  arbitrage,”   such   efforts   can   take   a   wide   array   of   forms. If a regulation makes it
more expensive for financial institutions to hold X-type assets than Y-type assets, for example, financial institutions will find ways to make Xs look like Ys
for purposes of the regulation. Similarly, innovative financial transactions may
be used to make it appear that an asset has been transferred from a regulated
entity, for which it is costly to hold such an asset, to a non-regulated entity,
even when the regulated entity retains an economic interest in the transferred
asset.93
That regulatory arbitrage contributed to the growth of the MBS and CDO
markets is well established.94 Much of the demand for AAA-rated assets came
from investors who faced regulatory or other constraints which required or
made it less costly for them to hold such assets.95 While such transactions may
91. E.g., Charles W. Calomiris, Financial Innovation, Regulation, and Reform, 29
CATO J.  65,  67  (2009)  (“[O]n an ex ante basis, risk was substantially underestimated in the
market during the subprime boom of 2003–07.”).
92. Id. at  65  (“Financial innovations often respond to regulation by sidestepping regulatory restrictions that would otherwise limit activities in which people wish to engage.”);
PARTNOY, supra note 6, at 46 (explaining that “a  major  impulse  for  financial  innovation [i]s
a desire to avoid regulation”)   (citing Merton H. Miller, Financial Innovation: The Last
Twenty Years and the Next, 21 J. OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 459 (1986))
93. BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, at 67-73 (describing  these  “boundary  problems”). See generally Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage,
89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010)    (”Regulatory arbitrage exploits the gap between the economic substance of a transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment, taking advantage of
the legal system's intrinsically limited ability to attach formal labels that track the economics
of transactions  with  sufficient  precision.”).
94. E.g., RAJAN, supra note 18, at 16; Calomiris, supra note 91, at 65.
95. E.g., Acharya et al., Tail Risk, supra note 7, at 295 (arguing that one of the primary
drivers of securitization transactions in the years leading up to the 2007-2009 financial crisis
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create value to the parties involved by allowing them to reduce the regulatory
burden to which they would otherwise be subject, such value is often not welfare enhancing. Moreover, regulated entities seeking to circumvent regulations
to which they are subject may be willing to pay a premium for the ability to do
so, skewing price signals and other market indicators.
b. Agency costs
Another key factor contributing to the spread of MBSs and CDOs was
agency costs. One source of agency costs arose from tensions between the individuals making investment decisions or overseeing those decisions and the persons whose money they were putting at risk.96 Notably, the complexity of
mortgage securities may have increased these agency costs by limiting the ability of shareholders and others to effectively monitor and identify self-serving
behavior.
Another reason that these transactions may have flourished even if they did
not create value is that the very complexity of the transactions may have increased the tendency of investors to rely upon the expertise of the financial intermediaries who sponsored the transactions, the agencies that rated them, and
the other parties involved in setting up these transactions.97 Because these parties earned significant fees for the services they provided, they often had a
strong incentive to consummate as many transactions as possible, even if
somewhat constrained by reputational and other considerations.98
While a thorough examination of these dynamics is beyond the scope of
this article, they are noted to make clear that the assumption (employed for the
sake of simplicity and to reduce the effect of hindsight bias) that these transac-

was an attempt by regulated financial entities to reduce the amount of capital they were required to hold under applicable regulations while not making commensurate adjustments in
the true risks to which they were exposed); Richard Cantor, Owain ap Gwilym & Stephen
Thomas, The Use of Credit Ratings in Investment Management in the US and Europe, J.
FIXED INCOME,  13,  14,  17  (Exhibit  1B)  (2007)  (noting  that  in  the  United  States,  “there  are  
currently over  100  federal  laws  and  50  regulations  incorporating  credit  ratings,”  and  finding  
that 74% of the fund managers in their study were subject to ratings-based restrictions on the
financial instruments they could hold).
96. E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating  Bankers’  Pay, 98 GEO.
L.J. 247, 249 (2010); Okamoto, supra note 58, at 188; Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and
Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON
REG. 457, 457-58 (2009).
97. E.g., Lord  Adair  Turner,  Chairman,  U.K.  Fin.  Servs.  Auth.,  The  Economist’s  Inaugural   City   Lecture   (Jan.   21,   2009)   (“[T]here must be a suspicion that some and perhaps
much of the structuring and trading activity involved in the complex version of securitised
credit, was not required to deliver credit intermediation efficiently, but achieved an economic rent extraction made possible by the opacity of margins and the asymmetry of information
and knowledge between end users of financial services and producers.”).  
98. John C. Coffee, Jr., What Went Wrong? A Tragedy in Three Acts, 6 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 403, 408-10 (2009).
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tions appeared to create value at the time they were consummated likely overstates significantly the value of these transactions.
III. FRAGMENTATION NODES AND SYSTEMIC RISK
This Part examines two phenomena arising from the proliferation of fragmentation nodes which give rise to systemic risk—information loss and stickiness. Each examination explains why the phenomenon may be expected to
arise as fragmentation nodes proliferate and how the phenomenon may become
a source of systemic risk. Each is supported by evidence from the 2007-2009
financial crisis showing that MBS and CDO transactions did contribute to the
phenomenon, with troubling consequences.
A. Information loss
1. Fragmentation nodes and information loss
In any securities offering, the issuer selling the securities has more information about the value of the securities offered than potential investors.99 The
acts of conveying information (by the seller) and processing information (by
the investor) are resource intensive. While a seller must be able to convey sufficient information to a potential investor to convince the investor that the expected returns justify the price being asked, the cost to both parties of this information exchange ensures that the buyer will never know quite as much as
the seller. As a result, some information is lost in every transaction.100 Thus,
the issue here is not just that information is lost, but that the nature and magnitude of the information loss arising from MBSs and CDOs is sufficiently distinctive to merit particular attention. There are a number of reasons for this.
We can understand the informational challenge by considering the four
sources of complexity inherent in fragmentation nodes—fragmentation, the
creation of contingent and dynamic economic interests, a latent competitive
tendency among the tranches, and the lengthening of the chain separating investor and investment.101 Because of fragmentation, the number of persons
99. Bernard S. Black, Information Asymmetry, the Internet, and Securities Offerings, 2
J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 91, 92 (1998) (“[T]he  single  largest  cost  that  stands  between  
issuers and investors is the problem of asymmetric  information.”).  
100. See id. at 92-93.
101. The account here provides a more thorough analysis of the relationship between
the sources of complexity inherent in fragmentation nodes and the resultant information loss,
which is critical if we are going to understand how these dynamics might arise again, but it is
far from the first to point out that the complexity of these transaction structures contributed
to a loss of information. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 98, at 409; Scott & Taylor, supra note
87; The Gods Strike Back: A Special Report on Financial Risk, ECONOMIST, Feb. 13, 2010,
at 2; Jennifer E. Bethel, Allen Ferrell & Gang Hu, Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation
Arising from the 2007-2008 Credit Crisis, 26 (Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Eco-
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with an economic interest in a home loan increases dramatically when that loan
is placed into a fragmentation node. As a result, each investor has only a very
small stake in the performance of any particular loan underlying its investment
and an investor would face a massive informational burden if it actually sought
to understand all of the loans underlying its investment. Moreover, as reflected
in the dynamic and contingent nature of the economic interests created, each
investor’s  economic  stake  in  any  particular  loan  is  not  fixed. Rather, an MBS
investor’s  interest  in  a  loan  varies  depending  upon  its  performance  and  the  performance of the other loans with which it is pooled, so an investor must be concerned with correlation among the performance of the assets.
The second and third sources of complexity further increase the informational burden an MBS investor faces in that the value of a particular MBS also
depends upon the mechanisms built into the waterfall to allocate cash flow
rights among the various tranches.102 The informational burden created by the
relevance of these credit enhancement mechanisms, as well as the pertinence of
the degree of correlation in the default risk of the assets in the portfolio, merit
particular attention because these are informational burdens that did not exist
prior to the creation of the fragmentation node. As a result, the information loss
arising from these transactions is not just the byproduct of inevitable information asymmetries, but is also a product of the introduction of new information—information which no party may be adequately incentivized to fully understand. The fourth and final source of complexity—the length of the chain—
increases the informational burden on an investor by limiting the investor’s  
ability to observe directly the quality of the assets underlying its investment.
This stands in stark contrast to the direct relationship between a bank and a
homeowner which would exist in the absence of securitization and which might
enable the bank to monitor both the home and borrower more closely.
The informational burden placed on an investor is magnified with the addition of a second or third fragmentation node, such as a CDO or a CDO2.103
When the assets underlying a fragmentation node are themselves structured
finance products, each asset requires just as much effort to understand fully as
the single MBS just described. The magnitude of the informational burden this
places on a potential CDO investor arises both from the compounding of the
number of assets which ultimately underlie the investment—recall the number
of home loans and other assets underlying the CDO2 described by Scott and
Taylor—and from the fact that the cash flows coming from each of those assets
go through two (or more) different fragmentation nodes before reaching the innomics, and Business Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 612, 2008) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1096582.
102. E.g., Ingo Fender & Janet Mitchell, The Future of Securitisation: How to Align Incentives?, BIS Q. REV., Sept. 2009, at 27, 30.
103. See, e.g., The Gods Strike Back, supra note 101,  at  2  (“A  proper  understanding  of  a  
typical collateralised debt obligation . . . would have required reading 30,000 pages of documentation.”).  
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vestor. As a result, the relationships among the expected performance of the assets gathered at each node and the terms of the waterfall for each node are
layered on top of information about the quality of the thousands (or tens or
hundreds of thousands) of home loans ultimately underlying the CDO security
issued as information relevant to the value of that security.
On the other side of these massive potential informational burdens lies a
very modest return to investors, particularly for the AAA-rated tranches which
constituted the great majority, in terms of principal value, of the MBS and
CDO securities issued.104 At the same time, because MBSs and CDOs are
fixed-income securities with finite life spans, the upside potential on these securities is necessarily capped. This distinguishes these securities from other assets like stock, commodities and real estate, for which the potential gains are
not so limited. The limited upside offered by these securities is critical because
a potential investor will not expend greater resources collecting and processing
information about a security than the excess returns that investor expects to receive from that investment.105
To be clear, the claim here does not relate to whether it was possible for
investors to obtain sufficient information upon which to make an investment
decision in light of these constraints. One may argue that it was irrational for an
investor to acquire these securities without a better understanding of the associated risks. Nor does the claim rely on any assumptions regarding the degree
to which investors may have relied upon credit ratings or the reasonableness of
such reliance. These are not the type of assessments that regulators or other
outside observers are in a good position to make. The claim, rather, is that because of the limited amount of resources investors rationally could have expended learning about the MBSs and CDOs prior to making an acquisition decision and the amount of information potentially relevant to the value of the
those securities, an outside observer could have surmised that most investors
were acquiring these securities without a complete understanding of all of the
information pertinent to their value. The net result was that, as fragmentation
nodes backed by home loans rapidly spread prior to the 2007-2009 financial
crisis, there was an equally rapid and systematic loss of information about the
quality of the underlying home loans and the value of the various securities
backed by them. We now turn to address the consequences of that information

104. See, e.g., Yongheng Deng, Stuart A. Gabriel & Anthony B. Sanders, CDO Market
Implosion and the Pricing of Subprime Mortgage-Backed Securities, 20 J. HOUSING ECON.
68, 70-71 figs. 1 &2 (2011) (showing the average spread between U.S. Treasury bonds and
subprime MBS and the average spread between U.S. Treasury bonds and CDOs backed by
subprime MBS to each be within the range of 2-4% between 2004 and 2006).
105. See Schwarcz, supra note   1,   at   221   (Applying   the   “rational   ignorance   theory”   to  
the  evaluation  of  complex  securities  to  explain  why  “[c]omplexity  can  deprive  investors and
other   market   participants   of   the   understanding   needed   for   markets   to   operate   effectively”  
even if all of the information regarding an investment is made available to investors).
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loss, namely, that it contributed to inaccurate price signals and greater systemic
fragility. Each is addressed in turn.
2. Inaccurate price signals and bubbles
Financial crises are often preceded by a bubble in which one or more
classes of assets are traded at prices far in excess of their fundamental values.106 While information loss is not a necessary condition for a bubble to
form, it may facilitate the growth of a bubble. As Ronald Gilson and Reinier
Kraakman explain in their classic article on the mechanisms of market efficiency, the accuracy of price signals depends in part on the presence of informed
traders in the relevant marketplace.107 The lack of sufficiently capitalized informed traders (relative to poorly informed traders) can increase the amount of
noise surrounding the price signals created in that market.108 While the amount
of noise need not skew the price signals so long as the direction of the noise is
arbitrary, the lack of informed price signals may create an environment in
which it is easier for a bubble to develop.
To understand the role of information loss in the events preceding the
2007-2009 financial crisis, it is necessary to recognize that the real estate bubble was in fact two related, but distinct bubbles—one in real estate and a
second in mortgage securities. The real estate bubble was enabled, at least in
part, by the influx of capital into mortgage securities which increased the
amount of capital available for home loans, particularly subprime home
loans.109 Without that influx of capital, and, more specifically, the expectation
among mortgage originators that they could quickly and easily resell loans into
the secondary market, lending standards most likely would not have declined as
far as they did and real estate prices would not have escalated as high as they
did. That capital, however, came in significant part from investors who did not
have a clear view through to the quality of the loans underlying their investments.

106. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 12, at 10  (recognizing  that  the  “most  dangerous  type  
of  recession/depression  is  caused  by  the  bursting  of  an  investment  bubble”);;  Franklin  Allen,  
Ana Babus & Elena Carletti, Financial Crises: Theory and Evidence, 1 ANN. REV. FIN.
ECON. 97, 98 (2009) (noting that research  on  financial  crises  has  shown  “that  systemic  banking crises are typically preceded by credit booms and asset  price  bubbles”).
107. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
108. Id at 565-92. A distinct but related consideration contributing to these bubbles
were limitations on the ability of investors to take short positions on housing prices. E.g.,
Patricia A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1373
(2009).
109. RAJAN, supra note 18, at 16; John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the
SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 731-32 (2009).
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As we saw in Part II, strong investor demand for AAA-rated assets offering
slightly higher yields than other comparably rated investments translated into
demand for highly rated subprime MBSs and CDOs. That demand in turn
created a demand for subprime loans which could be packaged into subprime
MBSs and subprime MBSs which could be packaged into CDOs. Information
loss was likely critical to the growth of these interdependent markets. The lower rated tranches of MBSs are often the most informationally sensitive, so the
buyers of these tranches generally have the greatest incentive to scrutinize
closely the quality of the underlying home loans.110 The ability to sell these
tranches to CDOs combined with the fact that it was irrational for most CDO
investors to examine closely the home loans ultimately underlying those investments (because of the resource/return tradeoff just discussed) suggests that
the growth of the CDO and CDO2 markets and the information losses accompanying that growth may well have contributed to the degradation in underwriting standards and practices and the growth of the subprime market. Those developments, in turn, facilitated real estate speculation, accentuating the
tendency of the influx of capital from mortgage securities to drive up real estate
prices.111
This account, while somewhat speculative, is supported by the data available. For example, the federal panel created to investigate the causes of the
2007-2009 financial crisis, the Federal Crisis Inquiry Commission, undertook
an  “examination  of  the  relative  performance  of  mortgages  purchased  or  guaranteed by the GSEs”   and “those   securitized   in   the   private   market.”112 Because
loans owned or guaranteed by a GSE were not originated by that GSE and thus
should be similar to loans packaged into private-label MBS to the extent that
issues arise merely from the separation of loan origination and ownership, the
FCIC’s  findings  provide  valuable  insights  into  the  effects  of  adding  a  fragmentation node to the equation. Their findings strongly suggest that the presence of
a fragmentation node has a significant and deleterious effect.
The  FCIC’s  examination  reveals  that  “[t]he worst-performing 5% of [the]
loans [held or guaranteed by the GSEs] are in subgroups with rates of serious
delinquency similar to the best-performing 5% of . . . loans”  packaged  into   a  
fragmentation node.113 The subgroups employed by the FCIC enable them to
control for other variables, such as the credit score of the borrower and the
amount of the loan relative to the value of the home it financed. They further

110. Cf. MacKenzie, supra note 67, at 1799-80 ; John Kiff & Michael Kisser, Asset Securitization and Optimal Retention 27 (Int’l  Monetary  Fund,  WP/10/74, 2010) (showing that
under certain circumstances, “the  screening level under mezzanine retention is actually lower
than if the securitizer had retained the equity tranche”).  
111. E.g., Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Essay, Systemic Risk and Market Institutions, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 445, 445 (2009)  (arguing  that  it  was  “the  pro-cyclical expansion of underpriced credit [through private-label  MBSs]  …  that  drove  asset  prices up”).
112. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 68, at 216.
113. Id. at 218.
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found that, for   borrowers   with   credit   scores   below   660,   “by the end of 2008,
GSE mortgages were far less likely to be seriously delinquent than were nonGSE securitized mortgages: 6.2% versus 28.3%.”114
This data and other anecdotal evidence strongly suggest that—while far
from the only cause—the loss of information arising from the length and the
complexity of the chain separating MBS and CDO investors from the home
loans underlying their investments facilitated the growth of both the real estate
bubble and the related bubble in mortgage securities.115 Had a typical CDO investor been able to see plainly the quality of the home loans underlying his investment, he likely would not have been so willing to invest for such a modest
return, and less capital would have been available to make low-quality home
loans.
To be sure, there are two related issues at stake here. One is the mispricing
of the risk associated with home loans, particularly subprime home loans,
which was a primary factor in both the real estate and mortgage security bubbles. The other, related issue is the extension of loans that were particularly unlikely to be repaid even on the excessively generous terms on which they were
being offered. The claim here is that both may be traced, at least in part, to the
information loss that resulted from the proliferation of MBSs and CDOs. The
FCIC’s   finding   that   loans   packaged   into   fragmentation   nodes   performed   substantially worse than seemingly similar GSE loans suggests that the presence of
a fragmentation node increased the probability of low-quality loans being
made.116 Moreover, as reflected in the timing of the decline in underwriting
standards and practices and the growth of the CDO market, there is reason to
suspect that as the number of fragmentation nodes along the typical chain increased, so too did the proportion of low-quality underlying assets.117 The empirical evidence is thus consistent with the conjecture that as the number of
fragmentation nodes increased, so too did the rate at which home loans were
extended that should not have been. Moreover, because the magnitude of a
bubble may be viewed as the difference between the fundamental value of an
asset and the price paid, and because the lowest quality loans should have
fetched the lowest prices, this evidence also suggests that the amount of frothi114. Id. at xxvi.
115. Christopher  Cox,  Former  Chairman,  U.S.  Sec.  Exch.  Comm’n,  Testimony  before  

the   Fin.   Crisis   Inquiry   Comm’n   (May   5,   2010),  
available
at
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/fcic/20110310185627/http://c0182412.cdn1.cloudfiles.
rackspacecloud.com/2010-0505-Cox.pdf (quoting  with  approval  the  fact  that  “if  honest  lending practices had been followed, much of this crisis quite simply would not have occurred”).
Further support for this conjecture arises from the fact that it may be rational for investors to
vary the amount of information they collect based on their perception of the state of the
economy, and investors also will tend to invest little effort in detecting fraud during booms.
Paul Povel, Rajdeep Singh & Andrew Winton, Booms, Busts, and Fraud, 20 REV. FIN.
STUDIES 1219, 1220-21 (2007)
116
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 68, at 216-18.
117. See supra Section II.B.2.
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ness may well have increased with the number of fragmentation nodes separating the ultimate investor from the underlying home loan. The two issues are
correlated, and are at least partially attributable to information loss, because of
the reduced incentive and capacity of the ultimate investors to conduct due diligence regarding the quality of the underlying assets and to understand the ways
that changes in the prices of the underlying assets (or correlations among them)
might impact the value of MBSs and CDOs backed by them. In short, while information loss may not be necessary for a bubble to arise, hindsight suggests
that it may well have played a role in the bubbles which preceded the 20072009 financial crisis, and that the dynamics that occurred may well arise again.
3. Fragility
In addition to facilitating inaccurate price signals and the growth of bubbles, information loss contributes to systemic risk in other, more direct ways.
To understand how, it is necessary to revisit the question of what makes a risk
systemic. As Amir Khandani, Andrew Lo, and   Robert   Merton   explain,   “systemic risk . . . arises when large financial losses affect important economic entities that are unprepared for and unable to withstand such losses, causing a cascade   of   failures   and   widespread   loss   of   confidence.”118 Lack of information
increases the likelihood of such a scenario in at least three ways.
First, when information is lost, risks may be passed on without the recipient fully appreciating the nature or magnitude of the risk to which he is now
exposed. In addition to increasing the likelihood that the price the recipient
pays for an asset is not commensurate with its risk, as just described, this uninformed risk assumption increases the likelihood that the recipient will not be
positioned to withstand the associated losses should the risk become manifest.
Second, information loss makes market participants more reactive to new
information. One well-recognized mechanism through which local financial
distress  can  spread  to  the  banking  system  generally  is  “similarity”  or  “common  
mode   failure.” This arises when the failure of one financial institution sends
signals to the marketplace about the financial well-being of other institutions
with similar exposures.119 If market participants were perfectly informed, of
course, a failure would not convey any new information. Lack of information is
thus a precondition to the capacity of such an event to convey information, and
the greater the amount of information that has been lost, the more informative
the signal may be (or may be perceived to be).120 As a result, as information
118. Khandani, Lo & Merton, supra note 25, at 46.
119. See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, at 3; Jeffrey

N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s  Dangers  and  
the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. REG. 151, 160 (2011).
120. This account uses the term information very broadly. A more detailed account of
the mechanisms through which this updating occurs would require more granular analysis of
the interplay between the hard facts known to an investor and the forecasting he necessarily
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loss increases, the financial system becomes more vulnerable to this type of
contagion, increasing systemic risk. The contagion can be set off by any signal,
perceived to be reliable, which conveys new information to the market about
the value of or risks posed by a particular class of assets or business strategy.121
Third, widespread information loss sets the stage for paralyzing uncertainty. When a signal conveys new information suggesting that an investor has
dramatically underappreciated the nature or magnitude of a risk to which he is
exposed, that revelation introduces the possibility that the investor may also be
exposed to other underappreciated risks. Thus, in addition to making adjustments directly responsive to the new information conveyed by the signal, the
investor is likely to exercise significantly greater caution in assessing and taking actions in response to other possible risks as well.122 The result can be
widespread panic. Put differently, massive information loss increases the likelihood  that  bad  information   will  be  of  the  “scary bad”  kind,  to  use  a  term  offered  by  John  Geanakoplos,  and  thus  have  the  effect  of  “increas[ing]  uncertainty  and  disagreement  about  the  future,”  “instead  of  clarifying  matters.”123
4. The unfolding of the 2007-2009 financial crisis
This Part considers evidence from the 2007-2009 financial crisis suggesting that the spread of fragmentation nodes backed by home loans did result in a
massive loss of information, and that loss became a source of systemic risk.
The descriptive portion of the account that follows draws heavily upon the
work of Gary Gorton who, because of his roles as a former consultant to AIG
and an academic economist, was particularly well positioned to understand the
evolution of the crisis.124 This account uses an overview of the early phases of
engages in to reach an informed view on the appropriate price of a security. See Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 107, at 562 (  “[T]he  acquisition  of  a  new  piece  of  ‘hard’  information  
of major importance is likely to affect the trader’s master forecast of price not only directly
but  also  indirectly,  by   altering  the  information  on  which  much  of  his  ‘soft,’  or  forecast  information is based”).
121. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES
90 (5th ed., 2005) (describing  the  way  “[n]ew  information  may  precipitate  a  crash”).  
122. See Joseph R. Mason, Regulating for Financial System Development, Financial
Institutions Stability, and Financial Innovation, in FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION IN THE
WAKE OF FINANCIAL CRISES: THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE 226, 232 (Alfredo Gigliobianco
and  Gianni  Toniolo  eds.,  2009)  (“In  an  asymmetric  information  financial crisis, investors—
knowing there has been a shock to asset values but not knowing the distribution of that shock
among investments—rationally pull back from the market as a whole to decrease their probable exposure.”).
123. Geanakoplos, supra note 32, at 104. Notably, Geanakoplos does address the possibility, claimed here, that characteristics of the environment into which the news is transmitted affects whether it is of the scary bad variety.
124. Interestingly, while Gorton provides one of the best examinations of the ways information loss contributed to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, he seems to view the information loss arising from the spread of MBSs and CDOs as largely idiosyncratic to that crisis.
GORTON, supra note 30, at 146 (stating  that  in  his  view  the  problem  does  not  lie  with  “securi-
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that crisis to establish the plausibility of the claim, drawing attention to indications that information was lost and the resultant losses contributed to systemic
instability through each of the three mechanisms just identified. For the sake of
brevity, many important subsequent developments, including ones supportive
of this claim, are not addressed.
As described in Part II, the performance of subprime home loans, MBSs
backed by subprime loans and CDOs containing, among other things, tranches
of subprime MBSs were correlated to each other, and to the housing market.
According   to   Gorton,   this   “was   widely   understood,”   but   “there   was   a   lack   of  
common   knowledge   about   the   effects   and   timing   of   house   price   changes.”125
As a result, early indications that housing values may have been weakening or
in decline were not immediately reflected in the prices of subprime MBSs,
CDOs, and other financial instruments with values linked to subprime MBSs
and CDOs, even though the expected future cash flows from these financial instruments could be significantly affected by the performance of the housing
market.
The key turning point, according to Gorton, was the introduction of the
ABX.HE index. The ABX index, launched in January 2006, tracks the value of
credit default swaps referencing a pool of twenty subprime MBSs issued in the
preceding six months for each of five credit ratings: AAA, AA, A, BBB, and
BBB-. New indices were formed every six months thereafter, until mid-2007.
These swaps were over-the-counter transactions in which one party agreed to
make  payments  to  the  other  upon  the  occurrence  of  enumerated  “credit  events”  
in the underlying subprime MBSs.126 The prices of these swaps were updated
on a daily basis. The indices thus provided a standardized and widely available
source of current information about the pricing of subprime risk.127 As other
economists  have  noted,  prior  to  the  introduction  of  the  ABX  index,  “there  was  
no real mechanism for aggregating information about the value of subprime
mortgages and the securities which  they  collateralized.”128
In early 2007, the ABX index referencing BBB-rated MBS for the first
quarter of 2007 began to fall shortly after issuance, and the same index for the
second quarter of 2007 started trading substantially below par. Because of the
unique visibility of these indices, their rapid decline sent a strong signal to all
tization  generally”  but  rather  lies  with  “the  particular  form  of   the design of subprime mortgages”).   By   developing a theory about why information loss may be expected to increase
systemic risk as a general matter, this Article goes beyond his analysis of this issue.
125. Gorton, supra note 53, at 21-22.
126. The  credit  events  “includ[e]  interest  shortfall,  principal  shortfall,  or  a  writedown  of  
the  underlying  subprime  MBS.”  Dunbar  et  al.,  supra note 44, at 135.
127. Markit
ABX.HE—Product
Summary,
MARKIT.COM,
http://www.markit.com/en/products/data/indices/structured-finance-indices/abx/abx.page?
(last  visited  Jan.  9,  2011)  (explaining  that  the  indices  provide  “a  liquid,  tradeable  tool”  which  
enables  “investors  to  accurately  gaugue  [sic]  market  sentiment  around  the asset-class, and to
take short or long positions accordingly”).  
128. Dunbar et al., supra note 44, at 134; see also Gorton, supra note 53, at 20.

JUDGE_ROUND 2 - KEJ EDITS (DO NOT DELETE)

Month 20xx] DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE

1/23/2012 11:25 AM

143

market participants that financial instruments exposed to subprime risk were
worth substantially less than the prices at which they had been trading. The effects of this signal were threefold and followed the mechanisms set forth above:
the holders of subprime MBSs, CDOs and other financial instruments with
subprime MBS exposure faced losses for which they had not adequately prepared, some of those entities faced financial distress, sending further signals to
the marketplace, and concern about the possibility of underappreciated risks in
other assets led to a wave of uncertainty, sending at least some market participants into a panic-like state and severely disrupting the functioning of a number
of markets.
When the ABX index started its decline, structured investment vehicles
(SIVs), asset-backed commercial paper conduits, and other similar entities
funded in whole or in part by short-term asset-backed commercial paper were
among the parties holding MBSs and CDOs.129 These managed entities made
money by funding such longer term assets with shorter term liabilities (like
commercial paper) and were central features of the shadow banking system.130
The precipitous fall in the ABX indices  was  followed  by  a  “run”  on  these  SIVs,  
as investors in the short-term asset-backed commercial paper funding the SIVs
refused to roll over those investments as they matured.131
The actual risk exposures of these SIVs, established with the benefit of
hindsight, cannot justify investor response.132 Thus, the cause of this run was
not the actual credit risk to which these entities were exposed, but rather uncertainty about the magnitude of that risk, prompted by the informational signal
sent by the rapid decline in the ABX index, and the fact that investors had only
a limited understanding of the actual risks to which the SIVs (and hence the CP
which they issued) were exposed.133 As Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke explained in a speech a few months later:
[T]he developments in subprime were perhaps more a trigger than a fundamental cause of the financial turmoil. The episode led investors to become
more uncertain about valuations of a range of complex or opaque structured
credit products, not just those backed by subprime mortgages. They also
reacted to market developments by increasing their assessment of the risks as-

129. See, e.g., Money Market Fund Reform, 74 Fed. Reg. 32688, 32691 (proposed July
8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274) (providing a summary of these developments); Acharya et al., Tail Risk, supra note 7, at 281; Gorton, supra note 53, at 24.
130. See, e.g., Gerding, supra note 3, at 14-15.
131. E.g., Acharya et al., Tail Risk, supra note 7, at 283 (explaining that during this collapse of the market for asset-backed commercial  paper,  the  cost  of  issuing  such  paper  “rose  
from just 15 basis  points  over  the  Federal  Funds  rate  to  over  100  basis  points,”  effectively
requiring the SIV sponsors to bail them out).
132. See Gorton, supra note 53, at 24.
133. This reaction may have been particularly swift because many of the investors in
those entities were money market funds, which may be particularly quick to divest themselves of assets with uncertain risk exposures. See, e.g., Money Market Fund Reform, 74
Fed. Reg. supra note 129, at 32691.
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sociated with a number of assets and, to some degree, by reducing their willingness to take on risk more generally. 134

To be sure, Bernanke underestimated the magnitude of the problems to come
when he made these statements, but that does not undermine his assessment of
the processes through which investors responded to these developments.
Following the run on SIVs, the market for repurchase agreements (repos),
fully secured short-term loans, contracted dramatically.135 The repo market is
built upon the assumption that repos, because they are short-term, fully collateralized and entitled to certain preferences in the event of bankruptcy, are very
low-risk investments. The assets that had been used as collateral for repos included not only the subprime MBSs and CDOs described thus far but a variety
of other complex structured financial products as well. Just as had happened in
the run on SIVs, the uncertainty surrounding the value of subprime MBSs and
CDOs made it difficult for those seeking financing through repo agreements to
use any of these assets as collateral on terms commensurate with those they had
been able to obtain prior to the SIV run.136 Put differently, the rapidly declining
prices of subprime MBSs and CDOs forced investors to recognize how little
they knew about the fundamental value of other similarly complex financial instruments. This development led them to question whether other assets about
which they had a similar amount (or lack) of information might also be worth
far less than they had thought. As a result, individual participants in the marketplace became more risk averse in unison, which had adverse systemic consequences.137 Because many financial institutions, particularly investment
banks, had come to rely upon repo financing to fund their trading and other operations, the evaporation of the repo market adversely affected the ability of financial institutions to continue to serve as market makers for other financial
products, causing the markets for virtually all types of financial instruments to
contract.138
134. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address on the Recent Financial Turmoil and its Economic and Policy Consequences (Oct. 15, 2007).
135. The Gods Strike Back, supra note 101,   at   8   (explaining   that   “[a]s   confidence
ebbed, mortgage-backed  securities  could  no  longer  be  used  so  easily  as  collateral  in  .  .  .    ‘repo’  agreements.”);;  Gorton,  supra note 53, at 26 (describing how there was a run on repo).
136. E.g., Acharya et al., Tail Risk, supra note 7, at 303  (discussing  the  “abrupt  shifts  
in  the  market  price  of  risk   when  the  crisis  took  hold  in  August  2007”  and  suggesting they
came about because up until that time investors did not have a good understanding of the
risks to which financial institutions and entities they sponsored were exposed).
One of the primary effects of this uncertainty was that repo traders demanded a greater
haircut with respect to these types of assets which had the effect of limiting the amount of
short-term financing an entity could obtain using such assets as collateral.
137. BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, at 23 (“When  liquidity dries up, it disappears altogether rather than being re-allocated elsewhere . . . . Thus,
there is a generalized  decline  in  the  willingness  to  lend.”).
138. See, e.g., Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch
2007-2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 77, 80 (2009); The Gods Strike Back, supra note 101,
at 8.
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Among the financial institutions affected by these dramatic changes in the
repo market was investment bank Bear Stearns, which also was suffering from
insufficiently anticipated losses as a result of its sizeable portfolio of subprime
and other MBSs and CDOs.139 The combination resulted in a fire sale of Bear
Stearns to JP Morgan Chase, which, even at the fire-sale price of the transaction, was viable only because of significant financial support from the federal
government.140 This event in turn sent a signal to the market that other firms
with large MBS and CDO portfolios might also be facing severe financial distress.141 While it was not until months later that Lehman Brothers filed for
bankruptcy and the financial crisis reached its peak, the groundwork for those
failures was laid, and the mechanisms leading to those failures followed many
of the same patterns just described.142 The subprime crisis thus became a fullblown financial crisis, and the loss of information arising from the complexity
of the MBS and CDO transactions which had spread subprime risk played a
crucial role in this development.
As this account reflects, numerous factors operating together contributed to
the financial crisis. Without  investment  banks’  excessive  reliance  on  repos  and  
other modes of short-term financing, for example, the reverberations of the systematic loss of information about the value of the assets underlying MBSs and
CDOs would likely not have been as severe. At the same time, without information  loss,  investment  banks’  reliance  on  short-term financing might not have
been so problematic, and the magnitude of the 2007-2009 financial crisis might
have been much smaller. As will be discussed further in Part IV, we can begin
to see why information loss arising from complexity may be among the sources
of systemic risk regulators should target, but any such efforts should supplement, rather than supplant, other efforts to reduce systemic risk.
B. Stickiness
This Subpart examines a second source of systemic risk arising from the
complexity associated with the spread of MBSs and CDOs—stickiness. Stickiness here refers to the creation, within a dynamic financial market, of arrangements which are exceptionally difficult to modify. This part considers
how packaging home loans into fragmentation nodes increased their stickiness
and how such stickiness can become a source of systemic risk. In so doing, it

139. E.g., Ian Boardman, Note, The Collapse and Rescue of Bear Stearns, 28 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 42, 43-45 (2008).
140. Id. at 45-46.
141. Gordon & Muller, supra note 119, at 160.
142. See, e.g., Babus & Carletti, supra note  106,  at  99  (stating  that  the  “more  disruptive  
consequence”  of  the  Lehman  bankruptcy  “was  the  signal  it  sent”  as  “[r]eassessing  risks  previously overlooked, investors withdrew from the markets and liquidity  dried  up”).
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builds upon and adds to a growing body of literature looking at these dynamics.143
1. Fragmentation nodes and stickiness
One effect of the complex structure of fragmentation nodes is the capacity
of these transactions to function like an adhesive, holding in place the original
terms of the underlying assets. As described in Part II, the creation of multitranche structures in which the rights of each tranche are set by reference to the
original terms of the underlying assets creates a latent competitive tendency
among the different tranches. Because any modification in the terms of an underlying asset affects different tranches in a disparate manner, this competitive
tendency becomes manifest when circumstances arise which warrant such modification. In the context of an MBS, this means that any modification to the
terms of an underlying home loan will affect each tranche differently depending upon whether the interest rate, principal, or some other term is modified.
As the complexity of the MBS structure increases, so too does the range of
issues that can arise from modifications. This is reflected, for example, in the
various types of triggers which may be used to determine whether principal
should be distributed sequentially, and thus paid out only to the most senior
tranche still outstanding, or pro rata among all of the tranches. If such a trigger
is set by reference to the proportion of underlying loans that are delinquent at a
particular point in time, the process of renegotiating a significant number of
those underlying loans to avoid delinquency and default raises questions about
whether corresponding changes should be made to the terms of that trigger.
Given that the types of loan modifications at issue are ones that are expected to increase the aggregate cash flows into the securitization vehicle, one
may expect that the holders of the different tranches could work together to ensure the modifications are made, agreeing to corresponding changes in the
terms of each of the tranches of MBS as needed. There are, however, numerous
coordination challenges which must be overcome for this to happen, as the
terms of the MBS once issued may be changed only with the consent of all
holders.144 Thus, in addition to the latent competitive tendency among the
tranches becoming manifest, each of the other sources of complexity inherent
in fragmentation nodes further contributes to the stickiness of the original terms
of the underlying home loans.
143. E.g., Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075
(2009); Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and Application, 36
DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 75 (2011); Hu & Black, supra note 6, at 687; Adam J. Levitin & Tara
Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 58 (2011); Christopher Mayer, Edward
Morrison & Tomasz Piskorski, Essay, A New Proposal for Loan Modifications, 26 YALE J.
ON REG. 417, 418 (2009); Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 393.
144. Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 143, at 1091-92.
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The sheer numerosity of persons with an interest in an underlying loan—a
problem arising directly from the fragmentation of economic interests in that
loan—creates a host of coordination challenges.145 Contacting each of the investors, much less negotiating with and obtaining approvals from all of them, is
a highly resource-intensive endeavor. And if undertaken by anyone other than
the trustee (such as an MBS investor seeking to maximize the value of his investment in the face of changed circumstances), the task is made even more
challenging by the initial hurdle of trying to obtain the identities of all of the
investors holding MBSs issued in that transaction. Moreover, because of the
dynamic and contingent economic interests held by each tranche, the holder of
even the first-loss tranche may have a colorable claim that its interests were not
adequately protected depending upon the changes made. This creates a situation which is ripe for holdouts as well as genuine claims by holders of one or
more tranches that a particular modification inappropriately favors other
tranches. The magnitude of these coordination issues increases with both the
number of different tranches and the complexity of the specific bundle of rights
granted to investors in each tranche.
Further adding to the coordination challenge is the final source of complexity identified in Part II—the lengthening of the chain separating investor and
investment—as one or more of tranches of the MBS issued were often packaged into serial fragmentation nodes like CDOs. This raises a preliminary issue
of trying to determine who, on behalf of the CDO, may approve changes in the
terms of MBSs. Moreover, virtually all of the coordination challenges that arise
at the MBS level also arise at the level of the CDO. As a result, the packaging
of tranches of an MBS into a serial fragmentation node is likely to not just increase, but to compound in a dramatic, non-linear fashion the stickiness problems just described.
The same web of coordination challenges will inhibit changes to any other
agreements to which the securitization vehicle is a party, such as the servicing
agreement setting forth the duties and obligations of the servicer retained to
handle administrative matters associated with holding a home loan. They also
complicate substantially the task of any agent, like the servicer, charged with
maximizing the value of the underlying assets.146 The net result is a coordination nightmare which, as we will see, has had real and adverse systemic consequences.

145. Cf. Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 688 (1998) (describing the way
“[t]ransaction costs, holdouts, and rent-seeking may prevent”   efficient   solutions   when   too  
many persons hold an exclusion right with respect to a piece of property).
146. Steven L. Schwarcz. Keynote Address: The Conflicted Trustee Dilemma, 54
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 707, 708-14 (2010).
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2. Stickiness in the financial crisis
A core component of the 2007-2009 financial crisis has been the first nationwide fall in residential housing prices since the Great Depression. These
falling home prices contributed to a dramatic rise in the rate of defaults on
home loans.147 This Subpart shows how the stickiness just described inhibited
and otherwise adversely affected modifications to those home loans, and the
next Subpart shows how those effects became a source of systemic risk.
As noted in Part II, one key to making MBS structures work was the appointment of a servicer charged with collecting monthly payments from homeowners, distributing those proceeds to the securitization vehicle and dealing
with  other  issues  that  may  arise  in  connection  with  “servicing”  the  underlying
home loans.148 The obligations of a servicer to a private-label MBS securitization are set forth in a pooling and servicing agreement (servicing agreement).
When delinquency and default rates are low, the process of servicing a home
loan is largely ministerial. Foreclosures create some complications, but because
the need for a servicer to have the authority to oversee a foreclosure process
was apparent at the outset, servicing agreements contain detailed procedures for
the servicer to follow. The ability to address these situations ex ante through
contract eliminated the need to vest the servicer with much discretion, an arrangement that suited MBS investors and servicers alike.149
While foreclosure procedures may have been clear, foreclosure is not the
only option available to the holder of a home loan when a homeowner defaults.
Modifying the terms of that loan is another, and one which may be particularly
appropriate if circumstances have changed substantially since the loan was originated. While servicing agreements allow for modifications under certain circumstances, in the face of the skyrocketing default rates witnessed in the 20072009 financial crisis, the nature and scope of the authority granted to servicers
to deal with nonperforming loans was revealed to be inadequately defined, and,
in many regards, just inadequate. One recent study of servicing agreements
found that the terms of servicing agreements in private-label MBSs, while varying significantly, were alike in providing servicers insufficient guidance on
how to handle loan modifications and insufficient monetary incentives to pursue modification.150 Moreover, even when servicers had discretion to modify

147. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY & OFFICE OF THRIFT
SUPERVISION, OCC AND OTS MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT: DISCLOSURE OF NATIONAL BANK
AND FEDERAL THRIFT MORTGAGE LOAN DATA: FOURTH QUARTER 2009, at 14 (2010) (describing the increase in the proportion of mortgages that were seriously delinquent in 2009).
148. This discussion focuses solely on private-label MBSs.
149. E.g., 1 FRANKEL, supra note 38, at § 5.4, 179.
150. Larry Cordell, Karen Dynan, Andreas Lehnert, Nellie Liang & Eileen Mauskopf,
The Incentives of Mortgage Servicers: Myths and Realities 4, 17 (Divs. of Research & Statistics & Monetary Affairs, Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series 2008-46, 2008);
see also Mayer, Morrison & Piskorski, supra note 143,  at  423  (“Most  [servicing  agreements]

JUDGE_ROUND 2 - KEJ EDITS (DO NOT DELETE)

Month 20xx] DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE

1/23/2012 11:25 AM

149

loans, they were not given sufficient incentives to do so in ways that would
maximize the value of the loan.151 These deficiencies may be attributed to how
infrequently home loans were modified prior to the financial crisis or to an expectation that limiting the ability of a servicer to modify a home loan will, in
general, increase the expected return on that home loan.152
The effects of this stickiness, however, vary depending upon the circumstances in which it becomes manifest. When home values are stable or rising and
the amount owed on a home loan is less than the value of the home securing it
(as a result of a down payment, equity built up over the life of the loan, or rising home values), foreclosure enables the holder of the loan to recover most, if
not the full amount, of the loan outstanding at the time of default. The recovery
rate falls significantly, however, when housing values are depressed. As a result, when home prices started to fall at the beginning of the financial crisis, foreclosure often ceased to be the best way to maximize the value of loans in default, and modification became more important.153
Data regarding the rate of foreclosures and loan modifications during the
financial crisis reveal that servicers acting on behalf of MBSs have not been as
responsive to these developments as banks acting on their own behalf. One
study of seriously delinquent loans originated in or after 2005, revealed that the
securitization of a loan significantly increases the likelihood that the loan will
be foreclosed, rather than modified.154 A  subsequent  study  “us[ing] direct and
precise data on renegotiation actions of lenders”  found  “that distressed securitized loans are significantly less likely to be renegotiated (up to 36% in relative

do not explicitly limit modifications, but instead contain vague language that can paralyze
servicers.”).
151. See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 143, at 29 (  “It  makes  little  sense  [for  servicers] to maintain a large coterie of experienced loss mitigation personnel . . . . The lack of attention paid to loss mitigation, particularly during the bubble years, meant that there was limited loss mitigation capacity in the servicing system as mortgage defaults started to rise in
2006-2007.”).  Levitin  and  Twomey  provide  a  thoughtful  and  thorough  analysis of the principal-agent tension between MBS investors and servicers and the reasons the contractual arrangements in place failed to mitigate this tension. See generally id. at 69-84.
152. See Andrew Haughwout, Ebiere Okah & Joseph Tracy, Second Chances: Subprime Mortgage Modification and Re-Default 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report
No. 417, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1527870 (“Modification   of   existing  
mortgages  has  historically  been  quite  unusual  .  .  .  .”).  This  stickiness  may  have appeared efficient ex ante by discouraging strategic defaults. E.g., Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru, & Vikrant Vig, Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime
Mortgage Crisis, 97 J. FIN. ECON. 369, 394 (2010); see Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 143, at
1102.
153. A separate obstacle to loan modifications is the existence of a second lien on the
same underlying home. Mayer, Morrison & Piskorski, supra note 143, at 419.
154. Piskorski, Seru & Vig, supra note 152,  at  371  (“Conditional  on  a  loan  becoming  
seriously delinquent, we find that the foreclosure rate of bank-held loan [sic] is lower as
compared to securitized loans by around 3% to 7% in absolute terms (13% to 32% in relative
terms).”).
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terms) than similar bank-held loans.”155 These results make clear that securitization creates a bias toward foreclosure and strongly suggest that securitization
has hindered even efficient modifications.156
The evidence further suggests that even when loans are modified, loans
held by a bank are more likely to be modified in an efficient manner than a loan
that has been securitized. The same study that looked at the renegotiation actions   of   lenders   found   that   “conditional on modification, portfolio-held loans
receive   smaller   concessions   …   [y]et, their post-modification performance is
stronger.”157 It   thus  “appears   that servicers renegotiate their own loans more
efficiently than they do loans owned by outside investors.”158
Data compiled by federal regulators further suggest that even when a loan
is modified, the ways in which the terms of a loan are altered vary dramatically
depending upon whether it has been packaged into a fragmentation node. Data
for the fourth quarter of 2009 show that a homeowner granted a modification
had a 27.7% chance of receiving a principal reduction if his loan was retained
by the originating bank but only a 0.02% chance of such a reduction if his loan
instead was placed into a private-label MBS.159 In other words, in a large sample of loans, roughly half of which were retained by the originating bank and
half of which were packaged into private-label MBSs, 99.9% of the modifications involving a reduction in principal occurred in home loans retained by the
originating bank.160 This matters for the long-term performance of the modified
155. Sumit Agarwal, Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David, Souphala Chomsisengphet &
Douglas D. Evanoff, The Role of Securitization in Mortgage Renegotiation 102 J. FIN. ECON.
559, 560 (2011). Another study has found otherwise, but Piskorski, Seru, and Vig question
the robustness of those findings and the more precise methodology employed by Agarwal
and his co-authors resolves the debate. Compare Manuel Adelino, Kristopher Gerardi & Paul
S. Willen, Why  Don’t  Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures
and Securitization 3, 4-5 (Nat’l   Bureau   of   Econ.   Research,   Working   Paper   No. 15,159,
2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15159 (finding low levels of loan renegotiations but no meaningful differences in the effect of securitization on loan renegotiation rate
between loans that had been securitized and those that had not), with Piskorski, Seru, & Vig,
supra note 152, at 393-94 (describing limitations in the methodology used by Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen); Agarwal et al., supra note 155, at 559-61 (describing the debate and explaining why their study resolves in favor of the position that securitization does impact loan
modification rates).
156. Piskorski, Seru & Vig, supra note 152, at 394-95 (recognizing that market participants   may   not   have   anticipated   the   dramatic   downturn   in   the   housing   market,   so   “government initiatives facilitating renegotiation of securitized loans could benefit both borrowers
and investors”).
157. Agarwal et al., supra note 152, at 575.
158. Agarwal et al., supra note 152, at 575.
159. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY & OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION,
supra note 147, at 27 tbl.23. Of the 59,723 home loans modified during that period that were
either retained by the originating bank or packaged into a private-label MBS, 8431 included
a principal reduction, and of those 8426 were retained by the bank rather than securitized.
See id. at 27 tbl.22.
160. 51.0%, or 30,459, of the 59,723 loans in the relevant sample were retained as part
of   a   bank’s   portfolio.   See id. at 27, tbl.22; see also Geanakoplos, supra note 32, at 120
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loans because the likelihood that a borrower will re-default on a home loan is
lower when the modification takes the form of a reduction in principal.161 And,
because banks that hold a home loan have a direct financial stake in maximizing its value, these data provide further evidence that loans packaged into a private-label MBS are granted principal reductions far less often than would be
efficient.
The different rate of loan modification and the different types of modifications made may be attributed to the stickiness that arises from the packaging of
a home loan into a fragmentation node. As a preliminary matter, the packaging
of a home loan into a fragmentation node necessitates the use of an agent to
service those loans. The complexity inherent in fragmentation nodes then contributes to stickiness by creating competing interests among different classes of
investors and giving rise to an array of other coordination challenges. Those
sources of stickiness make it difficult, if not impossible, to modify the servicing
agreement or to put into place any alternative mechanism enabling MBS investors to authorize modifications in the underlying loans. They further contribute
to excess foreclosures by incentivizing a servicer to interpret narrowly the
scope of its discretionary authority in order to avoid the risk of one tranche
claiming that the servicer acted inappropriately. As explained in one study of
servicer behavior, concern  “about  legal  liability  from  dissatisfied  investors,  especially in cases where a modification benefits some MBS tranches at the expense of others,” was cited by some servicers as a reason for not pursuing loan
modification more frequently.162
The relative reluctance of servicers who do pursue loan modifications to
agree to a reduction in principal may also be attributable to a concern about the
disparate impact on different tranches. A reduction in the interest rate on a loan
generally leads to an incremental reduction in the cash flows coming into the
securitization vehicle over the remaining life of that loan. Because of the contingent and dynamic interests of each of the tranches, it may not be immediately clear which tranches would be most affected and how adversely. A principal
reduction, by contrast, is generally recorded immediately and deducted fully
from the most junior tranche outstanding.163 This increases the likelihood of
holders of that tranche crying foul.164 Reluctance to alter particular terms of a
(“Another indication that servicers have bad incentives is that when the big banks hold the
same  kind  of  loans  in  their  private  portfolios,  they  do  reduce  principal.”);;  Gretchen  Morgenson, Why Treasury Needs a Plan B for Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2009,  at  B1  (“Studying second-quarter government data . . . , [Laurie] Goodman found that when banks owned
the loans, 30.5 percent of modifications reduced principal balances. When they service
someone  else’s  loan  .  .  .  ,  they  rarely  allow  principal  reductions.”).  
161. Haughwout, Okah & Tracy, supra note 152, at 25-27; see Morgenson, supra note
160.
162. Cordell, Dynan, Lehnert, Liang & Mauskopf, supra note 150, at 4, 22-23.
163. Geanakoplos, supra note 32, at 119.
164. Schwarcz, supra note 28,  at  393  (noting  that  one  reason  “[s]ervicers  .  .  .  may  .  .  .  
prefer   foreclosure   over   restructuring”   is   that   restructuring   presents a greater litigation risk,
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loan is a more mild form of stickiness than reluctance to modify at all, but it is
still a form of stickiness and it arises from the same underlying causes.
To be clear, the claim here is not just about litigation risk. Legal reforms
were adopted to try to protect servicers from liability,165 and, while hard to
sever from other changes made around the same time, the reforms did not appear to have any substantial positive effect on the modification rate.166 Nor
does the claim deny that other factors, like second liens and insufficient servicer incentives, may also contribute to stickiness. Nonetheless, concern about unfair treatment of particular tranches may well still have been a significant factor
in servicer recalcitrance. One of the core challenges highlighted here is that different tranches will be affected in disparate ways depending upon how a loan is
modified. At the same time, because of the heterogeneity of fragmentation
nodes, no single formula can be devised in the abstract and then applied across
the board. As a result, for any third party—be it the mortgage servicer or even a
federal regulator—to step in and substantially reduce the principal amount
owed on a loan or otherwise modify its terms without making a corresponding
change to the terms of the fragmentation nodes virtually ensures that some
tranches will be disproportionately harmed while others receive effective windfalls. Even if lawfully empowered to do so, this risk appropriately will make
both servicers and federal regulators more hesitant to intervene.
This framing is important in part because it helps to explain why even the
government’s  attempts  to  shield  servicers  from  liability   have done little to increase the rate of loan modifications, particularly principal write-downs. Just as
importantly, perhaps, by showing that the same dynamics which preclude private market participants from modifying home loans may also inhibit effective
government   intervention,   it   could   help   to   explain   why   the   government’s   attempt to forestall defaults and foreclosures have been so ineffective in light of
the magnitude of the problem and strong political support to address foreclosures and falling home values.
While the challenges associated with the appointment of a servicer may be
viewed in significant part as a principal-agent problem, this tension was far
greater than it would have been had the principal been a single entity or even
numerous entities with perfectly aligned interests. The net effect was to make
the original terms of the home loans packaged into fragmentation nodes far
more sticky than they would otherwise have been. While the specific mechanisms through which this happened, involving the servicer, and the result, excess
which  “is  exacerbated  by  the  fact  that,  in  many  MBS,  CDO  and  ABS  CDO  transactions, cash
flows deriving from principal and interest are separately allocated to different investor
tranches”);; see Geanakoplos, supra note 32, at 119.
165. See, e.g., Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22,
§ 201, 123 Stat. 1632, 1638-40 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1639a (2006)) (providing a servicer safe harbor for mortgage loan modifications).
166. Geanakpolos, supra note 32, at 120 (noting that the new law did not lead to a rise
in loan modifications reducing principal).
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foreclosures, matter, the core of these problems lies deeper, in the very structure of fragmentation nodes and the use of serial fragmentation nodes.
3. Stickiness and systemic risk
That the packaging of a home loan into a fragmentation node increases the
likelihood that the loan will be foreclosed may seem unfortunate for the homeowners affected but not an issue of systemic significance. Had the packaging of
home loans into fragmentation nodes remained rare, this characterization may
have been accurate. But once it became the norm for home loans to be securitized, the systemic effects of these excess foreclosures, and hence of the stickiness giving rise to them, changed dramatically.
As Anna Gelpern and Adam Levitin  have  explained,  “when  .  .  . rigid contracts[, as home loans become when packaged into fragmentation nodes,] are
ubiquitous, they can function as social suicide pacts, compelling enforcement
despite   significant   externalities.”167 Henry Hu and Bernard Black have also
recognized the potential for this type of stickiness to become a source of systemic risk. According to Hu and Black, once securitization becomes widespread for a class of assets, such as home loans, this stickiness can lead to
“gridlock – defaults which could have been avoided if loans could have been
renegotiated, and a macro-level collapse in housing prices, which then drives
up  default  risk  for  all  lenders.”168
In other words, the stickiness arising from securitization contributed, perhaps significantly, to the falling home prices and the record rate of defaults
witnessed over the course of the crisis. This is because foreclosures cause home
values to fall further than they otherwise would, so a feedback loop forms. As
the last Subpart showed, stickiness results in more foreclosures than there
would have been had the home loans not been securitized.169 Those excess foreclosures depress home values further.170 Because the performance of home
loans generally, and subprime loans in particular, is closely linked to home values, this negative externality exacerbates the underlying problems—additional
homeowners are now unable to refinance, some of those homeowners default,

167. Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 143, at 1075; see also Piskorski, Seru & Vig, supra
note 152, at 395.
168. Hu & Black, supra note 6, at 691.
169. Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 143,  at  1125  (“[W]here  most  home  loans  are securitized under restrictive [servicing agreements], one would expect more foreclosures in an
economic  downturn.”);;  see Subpart III.B.2.
170. E.g., Geanakoplos, supra note 32,  at  107  (explaining  that  “Auction sales of foreclosed houses usually bring 30 percent less than comparable houses sold by their owners. . . .
[B]y going into foreclosure, a borrower lowers housing prices and makes it more likely that
his neighbor will do the same.”); Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 143, at 1125; Mayer, Morrison & Piskorski, supra note 143, at 417.
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and some of those defaults which would best be addressed through a loan modification are instead foreclosed. The loop then repeats itself.
The magnitude of the role played by this stickiness is difficult to gauge, but
a study by Amir Khandani, Andrew Lo, and Robert Merton on the effects of
cash-out refinancings by homeowners suggests that the effect of a feedback
loop in this area may be quite significant. The authors use a model to show that
the increased leverage in a typical home loan arising from cash-out refinancing
dramatically increased the fall in real estate values over the course of the crisis.
They identify as the reason: “a  destructive  feedback  loop  of  correlated  foreclosures, forced sales,  and  ultimately,  a  market  crash.”171 Because of the similarity
of the destructive feedback loop they identify (which they identify explicitly as
a source of systemic risk) and that arising from the stickiness here at issue,
there is reason to suspect that the identified stickiness may have played a significant contributory role in the dramatic decline in home values.172
The ongoing foreclosure crisis, depressed home values, and the persistently
high incidence of bank closures (many of which have been accredited to losses
on real estate and construction loans, the value of which may also have fallen
as a result of the stickiness described here) further suggest that stickiness may
have been an important contributor to systemic risk.173 The connection between
this stickiness and those phenomena is necessarily speculative and, because of
massive federal intervention to overcome this stickiness and other challenges to
home-loan modifications, may remain so.174 Nonetheless, the evidence available supports the notion that the original terms of a home loan become sticky
when the loan is placed into a fragmentation node, and terms that make the
competitive tendency among the tranches particularly salient, such as the principal value of the loan, become particularly sticky. Moreover, because of the
compounding of the coordination challenges that arise when one or more
tranches of an MBS is packaged into a serial fragmentation node, the terms of
the underlying loans become correspondingly stickier when a serial fragmentation node is added. As it became the norm for home loans to be packaged into
fragmentation nodes, those sources of stickiness became a source of systemic
risk. That risk became manifest when housing prices started to fall, leading to
excess foreclosures, which in turn fed a feedback loop of falling home values,

171. Khandani, Lo & Merton, supra note 25, at 3.
172. Foreclosures also contribute to other negative externalities, including adverse ef-

fects on the communities in which the foreclosed homes sit. E.g., Gelpern & Levitin, supra
note 143, at 1125; Mayer, Morrison & Piskorski, supra note 143, at 417.
173. See Sara Murray, Falling Home Prices Reveal Limits of Recovery, WALL ST. J.,
Jan.  26,  2011,  at  A2  (“Home  prices  have  buckled  under  excess  housing supply, exacerbated
by foreclosures.”).  
174. See, e.g., Phillip Swagel, The Financial Crisis: An Inside View, BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2009, at 1, 10-22, (providing a summary of the myriad
programs pursued by various federal agencies to address rising foreclosures in 2007 and
2008).
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more excess foreclosures, and greater losses for financial institutions and others
holding mortgage securities or otherwise exposed to home values. This illustrates the way that pervasive stickiness may, as a general matter, contribute to
a feedback loop through which even a small adverse change can be amplified
significantly, leading to systemic effects that the parties creating the sticky arrangements are not adequately incentivized to consider or avoid.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This Part addresses the policy implications of the case study. The sources
of systemic risk identified here—information loss and stickiness arising from
complexity—bear little resemblance to the sources of systemic risk that regulators have targeted traditionally. As we saw in Part I, however, systemic risk
regulation is a renewed priority of policymakers for good reason, and there is a
recognized need for new types of oversight, particularly macroprudential regulations aimed at maintaining the stability of the financial system as a whole.
This Part suggests that regulations targeting complexity arising from the spread
of financial innovations should be among the tools that regulators use in that
endeavor.
A. Looking back
Before examining what regulators could have done to address these sources
of systemic risk or what they should yet do, it is important to acknowledge that
these issues will almost assuredly not arise again in this context. There are numerous reasons for this. First and foremost is that market participants, once
burned, will be twice shy before again buying complex mortgage securities. In
light of the amount of attention MBSs and CDOs received in the 2007-2009 financial crisis and the taint that attention has cast on them, even market participants who believe that MBSs and CDOs may be good investments will proceed
with greater caution before acting on those beliefs. Moreover, a wide array of
legal reforms specifically designed to address issues raised by the spread of
MBSs and CDOs, including efforts to improve the quality of home loans, have
been or are in the process of being put into place.175 The collective effect of
such reforms, combined with the greater caution of market participants, virtually ensures that these particular securities will not again proliferate in ways giving rise to widespread information loss and stickiness. This article, accordingly,
makes no effort to propose specific reforms to address the issues raised.
175. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 5301 (Supp. IV 2010); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d, 77g, 78c,
78o, 78o-7, 78o-11, 1601-02, 1638-39, 1639c, 1639e, 1639h, 1640 (Supp. IV 2010); 17
C.F.R. pts. 229, 232, 240, 249; Prohibition against Conflicts of Interest in Certain Securitizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 60,320 (proposed Sept. 19, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230)
(proposing rule implementing section 621 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act).
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This article also refrains from making any firm claims about the types of
policies regulators should have adopted prior to the financial crisis to address
these sources of systemic risk. The complexity here at issue came bundled with
an array of other effects, both positive and negative. Consistent with the aim of
this article to function as a study in financial innovation, complexity, and systemic risk, no effort has been made to catalogue all of the other costs and benefits of securitization. Nor has this article addressed how the benefits and costs
of regulations directly targeting the sources of systemic risk highlighted here
compare and interact with other tools for reducing systemic risk. In Part I we
saw that many of the reforms adopted to reduce systemic risk thus far may have
the effect of encouraging innovations like securitization. This strongly suggests
that efforts to reduce systemic risk arising from the spread of such innovations
may be important complements to reforms targeting financial institutions. Nonetheless, it is beyond the scope of this article to compare more directly the benefits and costs of interventions targeting these sources of systemic risk relative
to other efforts to maintain the stability of the financial system.
The preceding analysis, however, does provide a foundation from which
we can draw inferences about the efficacy of different modes of regulation. By
examining the benefits and costs of different regulatory responses which could
have been adopted prior to the recent financial crisis to address information loss
and stickiness, this Part sheds light on how effective different types of regulations are likely to be in reducing the sources of systemic risk at issue. In so
doing, it sheds light on the types of tools which may be helpful to regulators as
they seek to address systemic risk associated arising from the spread of other
financial innovations.
B. Looking ahead
1. Disclosure
Disclosure is one of the most commonly used tools in financial regulation
and has been identified as potentially valuable in alleviating both of the sources
of systemic risk identified here.176 Better disclosure, by its nature, should reduce information loss and increased transparency could reduce the magnitude
of the coordination challenges that lead to stickiness. The preceding analysis,
however, makes clear that disclosure alone will not suffice.
Recall, CDOs were distributed almost exclusively to large, sophisticated
investors generally capable (or at least presumed to be under applicable securities laws) of identifying, obtaining, and processing the information required to
evaluate a potential investment. The rapid rate at which these transactions proliferated suggests that investors believed they had obtained sufficient informa-

176. See, e.g., Hu & Black, supra note 6, at 693; Scott & Taylor, supra note 87.
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tion about the securities to make an investment decision. Yet, as the discussion
of information loss in Part III makes clear, the amount of information most of
these investors obtained and processed was far from complete. These statements are not inherently consistent. Because of the costs to investors of obtaining and processing information, it may be rational for an investor to make an
investment with far less than perfect information. The challenge for policymakers is that the level of resources that an investor seeking to maximize its own
returns will invest in gathering information may well be less than is socially optimal. Accordingly, disclosure reforms can reduce but will not eliminate this
mismatch.
A recent study by Robert Bartlett supports the conjecture that mandating
greater disclosure would not have prevented this source of systemic risk. Bartlett shows that a major hedge fund with demonstrated analytic capability and a
strong financial incentive, in the form of a significant short position with respect to an insurance company with significant MBS and CDO exposure, nonetheless failed to utilize available information about the specific MBSs underlying   CDO   transactions   insured   by   the   company   in   analyzing   the   company’s  
exposure and expected losses on the insurance policies.177 Based upon that
failure and the contrast between  the  market’s  reaction  to  downgrades  in  CDOs  
the company insured and corporate debt insured by the same company, Bartlett
concludes   that   his   results   “are strongly suggestive that enhancing derivative
disclosures, by itself, is unlikely to reduce the uncertainty that often plagues
analysis  of  a  firm’s  exposure  to  complex  credit  derivatives  such  as  CDOs.”178
Similarly, better disclosure might reduce but will not eliminate the myriad
coordination challenges that give rise to stickiness. While disclosure might
lower the costs of identifying the other holders, for example, it cannot eliminate
the conflicts that arise from situations that cause the latent competitive tendencies among the tranches to become manifest.
This is not an argument against disclosure. Without disclosure, these problems would likely be substantially worse. Nonetheless, this analysis does suggest an inherent limit on the efficacy of disclosure to address these sources of
systemic risk. This case study, accordingly, provides support for the position,
already endorsed by others, that there are significant limitations on the capacity
of disclosure to address the risks associated with complex financial innovations.179

177. See generally Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A
Case Study of Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis (U.C. Berkeley, Pub. Law
Research Paper No. 1,585,953, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1585953.
178. Id. at 7.
179. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of
Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2004); Brunnermeier & Oehmke, supra note 81,
at 2 (discussing investor information overload); Turner, supra note 97.
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2. Chain length
The clear inadequacy of disclosure raises the question of what other tools
regulators might use to address the sources of systemic risk here at issue. Having shown that these risks arose from specific sources of complexity inherent in
fragmentation nodes, one response could be to seek ways to reduce those
sources of complexity. While the potential benefits of such regulations are
clear, so too are the potential pitfalls. Steven Schwarcz, for example, has
warned against this type of direct intervention. As  he  explains,  “[c]omplexity  is  
not an end in itself but usually is a by-product of salutary goals such as seeking
to transfer risk to parties better positioned to hold the risk and reducing the cost
of funding businesses. The harm averted by [proscribing transactions] would,
therefore,  likely  exceed  its  benefits.”180 This concern, while appropriate, does
not provide a sufficient basis for completely avoiding regulations targeting particular modes of financial innovation.
As a preliminary matter, virtually all regulations have costs. Costs are reasons to avoid a mode of regulation only if they exceed the expected benefits or
if there are no less costly ways to achieve the desired result. Neither condition
can be assumed in this context. Moreover, as discussed in Part I with respect to
capital-adequacy requirements, even traditional approaches to systemic-risk
regulation often involve limiting activities known to create value when times
are good in order to promote the stability of the financial system when the good
times end.
Put differently, the fact that a transaction creates value on a localized basis
does not mean that the transaction should not be regulated, as it may be socially
optimal to prevent some such transactions. In order for any transaction to be
efficient on net, it must not only create value, but the value created must exceed
the costs associated with the transaction, including increased systemic risk. It is
precisely because the parties to a transaction will never be adequately incentivized to avoid systemic risk that regulation is required. As illustrated by the
sources of systemic risk at issue here, many sources of systemic risk are the
byproduct of activities which, viewed in isolation, create value. It is for this
reason that Henry Hu has emphasized that regulators have a particular duty to
be mindful of, and responsive to, the systemic effects of financial innovation.181 When the systemic effects associated with the spread of a particular innovation include increased systemic risk, interventions that preclude otherwise
beneficial transactions may be justified.
The question thus becomes: how might regulators reduce the highlighted
sources of complexity while not overly restricting financial innovation and net
beneficial transactions? There were numerous developments in the evolution of

180. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH U. L.
REV. 211, 239 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
181. See Hu, supra note 6, at 1502-03.

JUDGE_ROUND 2 - KEJ EDITS (DO NOT DELETE)

Month 20xx] DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE

1/23/2012 11:25 AM

159

MBS and CDO transactions described in Part II which increased their complexity and the complexity of the capital markets in ways that contributed to both
information loss and stickiness. Most of those developments, however, added
only incrementally to these phenomena. Increasing the number and variety of
tranches, for example, increased the informational burden on potential investors
and the potential coordination challenges, but the additional information loss
and stickiness that resulted were roughly proportional to the development. Trying to create rules to limit such developments would be a difficult task, likely
requiring some relatively arbitrary line drawing.182 This Part suggests that
regulators should instead seek to intervene at points where there is a nonlinear
increase in the sources of complexity at issue with no corresponding jump in
the potential value created. Because the addition of a fragmentation node between the investor and the asset ultimately underlying its investment is precisely such a development, regulators could have sought ways to reduce the number of fragmentation nodes along that chain. Two examples illustrate.
a.

Discourage serial fragmentation nodes

The packaging of financial instruments that have already gone through one
fragmentation node into a second fragmentation node magnified the resultant
information loss and stickiness. By increasing exponentially the number of underlying assets, using assets which themselves are complex financial instruments, and using more complex structures, a CDO investor faces a far greater
information burden than an MBS investor, resulting in significantly greater information loss. Moreover, because CDOs often acquired the most informationally sensitive tranches of MBSs issued, the rise of CDOs played a critical role
in the systematic loss of information about the quality of the underlying home
loans and the value of securities backed by them. Similarly, while the packaging of a home loan into an MBS gives rise to stickiness as a result of coordination and other challenges, those issues are magnified when one or more
tranches of that MBS is packaged into a CDO. Restricting serial fragmentation
nodes would thus have gone a long way toward reducing the information loss
and stickiness arising from these transactions.
To be sure, restricting serial fragmentation nodes may have precluded
some beneficial transactions. Nonetheless, the potential benefits of serial nodes

182. Another policy option not discussed here is for regulators to work with market participants to encourage standardization. Particularly in light of the degree to which heterogeneity increased the informational burden on investors and reduced the options available ex
post to address the coordination issues that arose, facilitating standardization could be another important role for regulators to play. See, e.g., NOURIEL ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS
ECONOMICS: A CRASH COURSE IN THE FUTURE OF FINANCE 193-94 (2010) (advocating standardization). Notably, however, others have argued that standardization can actually result in
increased systemic risk. See, e.g., Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 323, 327 (2011).
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are far less evident than the benefits arising from the creation of the initial
fragmentation node, a fact that was apparent well before the crisis hit.183 This
not only makes it likely that the benefits of regulations targeting serial fragmentation nodes are likely to exceed the costs, but also suggests that the costs of a
regulatory error are likely to be relatively small.
It is also critical to recognize that regulators could have targeted serial
fragmentation nodes without banning such transactions outright. Regulators
could, for example, have made an upward adjustment on the risk-adjusted capital charge imposed on banks and other regulated entities for assets that have
passed through serial fragmentation nodes.184 Alternatively, regulators could
have imposed a transaction tax solely on transactions constituting a serial fragmentation node. These types of interventions do not require regulators to
second-guess the value arising from a transaction; they merely create a higher
threshold that must be satisfied, in terms of localized value creation, to offset
the potential for the transaction to contribute to systemic risk.185
b. Encourage simplifying alternatives
For the same reasons that it may have been appropriate for regulators to
discourage serial fragmentation nodes, regulators could have attempted to reduce the number of fragmentation nodes separating investor and investment by
encouraging financial innovations that shorten, and thereby simplify, the chain
separating these two ends. Had U.S. regulators looked abroad for such alternatives to MBSs and CDOs, they would have found a prime candidate—the covered bond. Covered bonds were used frequently in Europe prior to the financial
crisis and have proven far more resilient than private-label MBSs.186
Covered bonds are similar to MBSs in that they are backed by a pool of assets, such as home loans. They are different, however, in that they remain direct
obligations of the financial intermediary that issues them, and that intermediary

183. As described in Part II, supra, the primary benefits of securitization, such as enabling the separation of origination and ownership and pooling to provide diversification, are
accomplished with a single node.
184. The viability of such interventions is supported by the fact that regulations in the
nature of those proposed have been adopted in response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
E.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK
1, 30 (2009) (adding the   concept   of   “resecuritisation exposures”   and   imposing   higher   risk  
weights for such assets than for other securitized assets).
185. Cf. Fin. Economists Roundtable, Reforming the OTC Derivatives Markets, 22 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 40, 43 (2010) (proposing regulatory changes to the derivatives market
that  would  effectively  heighten  the  minimum  “marginal benefit of new products”  while  not  
forbidding further innovation, on the basis that the overall scheme proposed would reduce
systemic risk).
186. E.g., From Prussia with Love: The Covered Bond, ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 2008, at
80,  80  (noting  that  “covered bonds have grown into a $3 trillion asset class, dominated by
issuers in Europe[,]”  and  describing  certain  advantages  of  these  securities  over  MBSs).
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must replace the underlying assets if they fail to perform. As a result, as economist  Hyun  Song  Shin  has  explained,  in  contrast  to  an  MBS  the  “pool  serves  
mainly as credit enhancement and not as a means to obtain exposure to the underlying  assets.”187 The  net  effect  of  using  covered  bonds  is  thus  a  “shortening  
of  the  intermediation  chain”  separating  investor  and  investment.188
The use of covered bonds could substantially mitigate both information
loss and stickiness.189 Because the financial intermediary issuing the covered
bonds remains directly liable, it has an incentive to understand the expected
value and risks inherent in each of the underlying home loans. It also has the
incentive and ability to modify the loan in the face of dramatically changed circumstances. Moreover, like efforts to discourage serial fragmentation nodes,
this type of intervention could have been implemented in a variety of ways. In
light of the frequency with which covered bonds are used in other countries and
demand by U.S. investors for covered bonds, removing regulatory constraints
on the use of covered bonds and putting regulations into place to facilitate their
issuance might have been sufficient to spur banks to issue covered bonds.190
Regulators also could have pursued more aggressive policies, such as incentivizing regulated entities to acquire covered bonds, without mandating the issuance of covered bonds.
c.

“Market  forces”

It is important to note that the proposed interventions facilitate, as well as
impede, “market” forces. This is possible because of the myriad different types
of market forces at work in the capital markets. Some of those forces, and the
ones we have relied upon to produce an efficient and stable financial system,
involve market participants making varying assessments of the expected future
cash flows from a financial instrument and buying, selling, and engaging in
other activity based upon their assessments. The failure of these market forces
played a central role in the 2007-2009 financial crisis and can have significant
costs even apart from circumstances giving rise to a financial crisis.191

187. Hyun Song Shin, Financial Intermediation and the Post-Crisis Financial System
14  (Bank  for  Int’l  Settlements,  Working  Paper  No.  304,  2010).
188. See id. at 13.
189. There are also policy considerations apart from the reduction of these sources of
systemic risk for regulators to encourage the use of covered bonds in lieu of MBSs. See, e.g.,
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Conundrum of Covered Bonds, 66 BUS. LAW. 561, 573-86 (2011);
Shin, supra note 187, at 13-15.
190. See Covered Bond Policy Statement, 73 Fed. Reg. 21949, 21950 (Apr. 23, 2008)
(explaining that insured deposit institutions have expressed an interest in issuing covered
bonds and have sought guidance from the FDIC regarding applicable regulations); Prabha
Natarajan, Covered Bonds from Canada Set Record, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2010, at C6; Shin,
supra note 187, at 14-15.
191. E.g., Joseph E Stiglitz, Keynote Address at the Eighth BIS Annual Conference: Interpreting the Causes of the Great Recession of 2008 (June 25-26, 2009), in Financial Sys-
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As we saw in Part II, the market forces driving the spread of fragmentation
nodes backed by home loans were very different in nature. Those market forces
arose primarily from investor demand for financial instruments with particular
characteristics, such as a AAA rating and a higher rate of interest than other
AAA-rated instruments. The preceding account also showed how the latter type
of market forces (those arising from investor demands for financial instruments
with particular characteristics) can impede the efficient operation of the former
type of market forces (those focused on the fundamental value of the projects
underlying the financial instruments).192 Accordingly, the proposed regulatory
interventions could be characterized as efforts to restrain certain market forces
which have the potential to increase systemic risk, so that other market forces,
more likely to promote the efficiency and stability of the financial system, may
play a relatively greater role in shaping the capital markets.193
The possibility that reducing the number of fragmentation nodes separating
investor and investment may promote market efficiency is critical to understanding why such reforms may be warranted even with other reforms that
might address information loss or stickiness. One might, for example, argue
that reforms to reduce information loss are unnecessary in light of policy reforms intended to improve the accuracy of credit ratings. It is true that the loss
of information about the quality of the underlying loans and various securities
backed by them would have been far less problematic had the ratings given to
MBSs and CDOs been more accurate.194 Nonetheless, the process of assessing
the probability that a security will default is one that necessarily requires making numerous judgment calls about which reasonable minds can differ.195 A

tem and Macroeconomic Resilience: Revisited (Monetary  &  Econ.  Dep’t,  Bank  for  Int’l  Settlements,
BIS
Papers
No.
53,
2010)
4,
9-10,
available
at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap53.pdf.
192. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Unstable Banking, 97 J. FIN. ECON. 306,
306-07 (2010) (showing that steps taken by financial intermediaries to cater to shifting investor sentiment can increase the instability of the financial system).
193. See Lawrence G. Baxter, Internationalisation of Law – the   ‘Complex’   Case   of  
Bank Regulation, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF LAW: LEGISLATING, DECISION-MAKING,
PRACTICE AND EDUCATION 3, 23 (Mary Hiscock & William van Caenegem eds., 2010) (  “The  
principal consideration in attempting to reshape a dangerously unstable complex system such
as international banking [is how to] encourage[] more spontaneous self-ordering.”).
194. One challenge may be that the investors who were acquiring the AAA-rated MBSs
and CDOs prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis were doing so based on the assumption that
the  securities  were  “information  insensitive,”  and  thus  they  would  not  do  any  due  diligence  
regardless. While perhaps accurate as a descriptive matter for some of the investors, as we
saw above, the demand was not just for AAA-rated assets, but AAA-rated assets providing a
higher rate of return than other similarly rated assets, like U.S. treasury bonds. Despite the
possible shortage of truly information-insensitive securities relative to the demand, it should
come as little surprise to sophisticated investors that securities offering a higher rate of return
have some credit risk and should be assessed accordingly.
195. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 106, at 560-62  (explaining  that  “two different
types of information bear[] on   asset   price:   the   ‘hard’   information   of   known   facts,   and   the  
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capital market system in which one entity makes an informed decision about
the likelihood of default—and hence, the value of a debt instrument—and other
investors blindly accept the accuracy of that assessment is not the model of the
capital markets we have relied upon to produce a stable and efficient system for
the allocation of capital. Moreover, as we saw in the theoretical account of the
reasons that information loss may increase the fragility of the financial system,
investors acting in reliance on   others’   assessments rather than on the basis of
actual information are likely to react quickly and dramatically if a signal comes
to light suggesting financial instruments they own are riskier than they had realized. In such an environment, even an erroneous signal could cause widespread panic and deleterious market disruptions. To be clear, the claim here is
not that rating-agency reform is not warranted. As stated at the outset, the account of the crisis provided here and the policy responses proposed are intended to complement rather than compete with other accounts. The rating
agencies clearly failed in the task assigned to them in the years leading up to
the crisis and their failures certainly contributed so rating-agency reform is
clearly warranted. Rather, the claim here is that such reforms, even if successful, will not obviate the importance of structural reforms of the type proposed
here.
Similarly one could argue that market participants and regulators, appreciative of how problematic stickiness can be, can now devise tools narrowly designed to address the issue. Securitization transactions backed by other asset
types, for example, at times give agents greater authority and incentives to
modify the terms of the underlying assets.196 Similar schemes could, in theory,
be imported into MBSs and CDOs. The challenge presented by stickiness,
however, is not the narrow question of whether we can modify home loans
packaged into fragmentation nodes. The challenge is that each time a debt instrument is created, that instrument cannot feasibly address in detail how the
rights of the parties should be altered for every possible state of the world that
might arise over the life of the instrument. As a result, there will necessarily be
situations governed by standards ill-suited to address a particular set of circumstances and holes left completely unaddressed. The insufficient discretion
and incentives given to servicers to modify home loans in the face of dramatic
declines in the price of real estate is merely illustrative of the types of gaps that
are unavoidable when a loan is transformed from a bilateral relationship between a bank and a homeowner into an asset traded in the capital markets.
There is no simple or abstract solution to this challenge.
This article has introduced the notion of a fragmentation node and proposed tools which could be used to reduce the number of nodes separating investor and investment because such structural reforms have the potential to re-

‘soft’   information   of   forecasts   and   estimates[,]”   so   even   a   person   aware   of   every   relevant  
hard  fact  “would lack a type of information critical to price determination”).
196. See, e.g., Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 143, at 1103.
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duce both of these challenges irrespective of what the future holds. The longer
and more complex the chain separating investor and investment, the more difficult it will be for investors to engage in due diligence and make an informed,
independent assessment of the value of the security he is acquiring. Likewise,
the length and complexity of the chain tends to increase the stickiness of each
of its components, inhibiting even efficient changes in their terms should circumstances arise that were not adequately addressed at the time the underlying
financial instruments and other components were created. When a particular
financial innovation spreads and becomes pervasive, these tendencies can increase the fragility of the overall system. As we saw in the discussion of the
reasons for regulating systemic risk in Part I, these are the types of developments that no market participant will be adequately incentivized to identify and
address. While the number of fragmentation nodes separating investor and investment is a rough proxy for the effects here at issue, it is at least a viable one.
Accordingly, identifying and targeting new innovative financial structures that
change the landscape of the capital markets in ways akin to the changes
wrought by fragmentation nodes may be an important component of policy efforts to reduce systemic risk. The next part addresses other counterarguments to
this claim.
C. Some challenges
1. Recurrence
A core challenge in any case study is determining how broadly its findings
apply. Even if one accepts the role played by information loss and stickiness in
the 2007-2009 financial crisis and the potential utility of intervention, this
means little if these issues are unique to that crisis. This is unlikely.
Despite the dampening effect the 2007-2009 financial crisis has had on the
rate of financial innovation, there are reasons to expect ongoing innovation in
the years ahead. As a preliminary matter, recent history is replete with disasters
perceived to be so great that major reforms slowing financial innovation
seemed inevitable, but which brought about no such result. Enron’s  bankruptcy  
in 2001 following its abuse of structured-finance transactions (a field of finance
that includes securitization), for example, led many to believe that market participants and regulators would be more skeptical of structured finance and more
discerning in the evaluation of complex transactions. Similarly, the nearly cataclysmic collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998
similarly led many to expect that financial institutions would adopt more effective risk management regimes and be more cautious about the potential risks,
particularly systemic risks, to which they may be exposed. The dramatic rise in
securitization transactions and other developments leading up to the recent financial crisis belied these expectations.
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In addition, the recently adopted Dodd-Frank Act and other legal responses
to the financial crisis will likely operate as an impetus for further financial innovation. Efforts to reduce the cost of regulatory compliance, i.e., regulatory
arbitrage, are among the key drivers of financial innovation generally.197
Moreover, as discussed in Part I, many of the specific reforms adopted impose
new costs on banks and other financial institutions, increasing the potential
economic gains from innovations that enable funding activities traditionally
performed by banks to be moved into the capital markets. Securitization is precisely such an innovation. Accordingly, once economic conditions revive, we
can expect to see a rise in financial innovations like securitization and the shadow banking system of which it is a part.
Another consideration, reflected in the descriptive account in Part II, is the
intense pressure on banks and other financial institutions to develop and exploit
new financial innovations. As Henry  Hu  has  explained,  “[t]o  stay  competitive,  
banks constantly introduce new financial products because margins on products
decline  quickly.”198 Neither the financial crisis nor responses to it have reduced
those competitive pressures. Other academic experts have also taken the view
that despite the financial crisis, financial innovation will continue, if it does not
accelerate, in the coming years.199 Thus, although the specific events examined
below are unlikely to arise again, the overall trend of financial innovation is
likely to continue and an appropriately framed case study may provide valuable
insights into some of the challenges and opportunities such developments
create for regulators seeking to limit systemic risk.200
The question thus becomes whether financial innovations are likely to give
rise to the types of issues revealed in this case study. Again, there are reasons to
expect this is possible if not probable. The most obvious way these issues could
again arise would be in the context of fragmentation nodes backed by assets
other than home loans. A wide array of asset classes, including auto loans, aircraft leases, computer leases, credit card receivables, franchise loans, healthcare receivables, health club receivables, music royalties, tax liens, taxi medallion loans, and viatical settlements, have been packaged into fragmentation
nodes. Such transactions ground to a halt during the 2007-2009 financial crisis,
197. See Charles W. Calomiris, Financial Innovation, Regulation, and Reform, 29
CATO J. 65, 65-66 (2009); PARTNOY, supra note 6, at 48.
198. Hu, supra note 6, at 1479 (footnotes omitted); see also Charles W. Calomiris, The
Subprime   Turmoil:   What’s   Old,   What’s   New,   and   What’s   Next, 15 J. STRUCTURED FIN.,
Spring  2009,  at  6,  43  (“The  structure  of  U.S.  financial  intermediation will probably undergo
significant changes over the next few years . . . [as t]he American financial system, if it remains true to its history, will adapt and innovate its way back to profitability and high stock
prices  .  .  .  .”).  
199. E.g., Andrew W. Lo & Robert C. Merton, Preface to the Annual Review of Financial Economics, 1 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 1, 12 (2009) (suggesting  that  “the  implementation  
of  financial  innovation  is  likely  to  be  more  rapid  because  the  threshold  for  change  is  lower”).
200. The issue of how broadly the dynamics revealed in this study may be applied is
addressed in Part IV.
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but the market has started to revive.201 Some commentators have even suggested that the failure of MBSs and CDOs could lead to greater investor demand for the types of asset-backed securities that performed relatively well
during the financial crisis.202 At the same time, in light of the market and legal
responses to securitization in the wake of the crisis, it is possible that fragmentation nodes will not again give rise to the sources of systemic risk at issue.
Even outside the realm of securitization, however, complexity arising from
the spread of new financial innovations may well result in information loss and
stickiness. Many financial innovations, particularly those that could be used to
shift financing activities from regulated banks and into the capital markets, involve the parsing and repackaging of various rights and risks. As a result,
many, if not all, of the sources of complexity identified as inherent in fragmentation nodes—fragmentation, creation of contingent and dynamic economic interests, a latent competitive tendency among the different classes of investors
and the lengthening of the chain separating investor and investment—are likely
also to be present in new financial innovation. And, for the reasons we saw in
Part III, such innovations are likely to give rise to both massive informational
burdens that make information loss likely and coordination challenges giving
rise to effects like stickiness.
New financial innovations may also give rise to new sources of complexity
unlike those produced by fragmentation nodes, which could also give rise to
effects like information loss and stickiness. While the exact ways in which innovations may create complexity and impede information flows are difficult to
foresee, that innovations and the complexity that results from them will lead to
information losses seems probable, if not certain.
To be sure, information loss and stickiness do not always give rise to systemic risk. The accounts of information loss and stickiness arising from MBS
and CDO transactions as contributory forces in the 2007-2009 financial crisis
rested upon the fact that these transactions had become pervasive, taking on
systemic dimensions in the years leading up to the crisis. Had these transactions
remained rare, these phenomena would not have contributed to systemic risk in
the ways detailed above. As the case study also made clear, however, when an
innovation appears to create value on a localized basis, financial intermediaries
have a strong financial incentive to exploit that opportunity, and to be creative
in doing so, making it likely that such innovations will evolve and proliferate.
Accordingly, the likelihood of recurrence is not a reason for regulators to ignore the sources of systemic risk here at issue.

201. See, e.g., GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007
22 tbl.2.1 (2010) (identifying types of assets that have been securitized).
202. E.g., Calomiris, supra note 198, at 41-42.
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2. Identification
Another challenge could be that it is simply impractical to ask regulators to
identify these sources of systemic risk before they become manifest. While this
case study may enable regulators to identify and respond to the complexity arising from the spread of MBSs and CDOs, the dangers of those instruments have
already been made plain by the crisis. If complexity from the proliferation of a
different financial innovation arises, it will look too different for regulators to
readily recognize its capacity to contribute to information loss and stickiness.
The complexity that regulators do not see, much less understand, is most likely
to be problematic.
Such concerns are merited. The most pernicious forms of complexity may
well   be   disguised   in   sheep’s   clothing. As we saw in the story of MBSs and
CDOs, for example, the Gaussian copula and other similar devices played a key
role by providing market participants and regulators a plausible basis for believing that the complexity arising from fragmentation nodes could be managed
even without being understood directly. Similar stories are likely to accompany, and perhaps disguise, the complexity of future financial innovations. A related challenge, also illustrated in the case study, is that both the complexity of
individual instruments and the complexity in the market arising from their proliferation develop incrementally. The incremental nature of these processes
may result in market participants and regulators alike becoming overly accepting of innovations already used with apparent success, further adding to the
regulatory challenge. While there are no easy answers to these issues, they are
not a reason to avoid this type of regulation.
As a starting point, the analysis in Part II suggested some responses to
these challenges. First, regulators and others concerned about systemic risk can
seek ways to evaluate innovations with fresh eyes. Such perspective shifting
may, for example, have led to greater questioning of the efficacy of the mechanisms used to minimize the moral hazard inherent in the originate-todistribute mode of banking as the market for mortgage securities grew and
evolved. Second, regulators can seek ways to take a step back and consider the
systemic consequences of the evolution and proliferation of particular modes of
financial innovation, mindful of the possibility that the aggregate effects of
those developments may be qualitatively different from the effects of any individual transaction. The introduction of the term fragmentation node is intended
to facilitate this type of perspective shifting. The identification of other types of
“nodes”  that may be found along the chain separating investor and the ultimate,
underlying investment may facilitate such perspective shifting. In short, while it
may not be easy for regulators to identify these types of systemic risk in a timely fashion, the fact that they are not self-evident is a reason for—not against—
regulatory scrutiny.
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3. Response
A closely related counterargument is that even if regulators do identify a
potential issue, determining when and how to intervene is too challenging a
task for regulators to undertake, particularly considering the possibility of error.
Like the challenge of identifying problematic financial innovations, however,
these concerns justify regulatory caution but not abdication.
Determining when to intervene, for example, does pose a real challenge.
The accounts of systemic risk provided in Part III each hinged upon the pervasiveness of fragmentation nodes backed by home loans. If regulators delay intervention until a particular innovation is sufficiently pervasive to be a significant source of systemic risk, however, it may be far more difficult to intervene
productively. Ultimately, determining when to intervene may depend upon the
mode of intervention and the nature of the risk. Mild interventions, such as regulatory or other legal changes to facilitate a more favorable mode of financial
innovation, like covered bonds, and efforts to work with market participants to
encourage standardization may be appropriate before there is any indication of
trouble. Regulatory interventions that place a clear thumb on the scale, such as
adjustments in capital-adequacy requirements, may merit a slightly higher threshold. Proscriptions and other more draconian interventions can be used sparingly and only when regulators have an adequate understanding of the benefits
and risks of the financial innovation in question.
As with efforts to identify problematic sources of complexity, particular
indicia may aid regulators in this task. The fact that a financial innovation facilitates regulatory arbitrage may, for example, be a sign that regulators should
act sooner rather than later. This is both because to the extent regulatory arbitrage drives a transaction, there is less reason to assume that it creates any real
value, even on a localized basis and because regulated entities share a common
incentive to find ways around costly regulations, so an innovation that enables
such arbitrage is likely to spread.
It may also be appropriate for different regulators, or the same regulator
taking action with respect to different types of regulated entities, to act at different times. As reflected in the current regulatory scheme, different regulated
entities may pose very different risks and thus are appropriately subject to very
different types of regulations. Money market funds, for example, are subject to
far more stringent limitations on the assets they can hold than most other regulated entities. There are a variety of reasons for this, including the fact that the
money  market  funds’  efforts  to  avoid  “breaking  the buck” can make them particularly skittish, constraints on the efficacy of market checks on their performance, and the critical role the funds play in the provision of short-term financ-
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ing.203 It may, accordingly, be appropriate for the Securities and Exchange
Commission, which has oversight authority over money market funds, to be
particularly aggressive in ensuring that the funds do not acquire assets with
risks they cannot easily assess. Such an approach would have the advantage of
allowing various regulatory bodies to learn from one another before instituting
their own rules.
As a general matter, the policy proposals set forth above provide a framework for the type of interventions likely to be effective. The process of translating these ideas into practice will need to be responsive to a number of contextspecific considerations. This need for customization limits the extent of useful
guidance that can be provided in the abstract, but it is not a reason to avoid this
type of regulation altogether.
CONCLUSION
While the next financial crisis will inevitably look different from the one
that just passed, how different it is, and how many years pass before it strikes
depend in part on how effectively we learn the lessons of the recent crisis. This
Article adds to the growing body of work seeking to ensure that the next financial crisis does not arise prematurely. By exploring the interactions among financial innovation, complexity, and systemic risk, this Article has shed new
light on the ways the complexity arising from the spread of financial innovations may contribute to systemic risk and the tools that may be most effective in
addressing those sources of systemic risk.

203. See Money Market Fund Reform, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,807,
74 Fed. Reg. 32,688, 32,689-90 (proposed June 30, 2009), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-07-08/pdf/E9-15906.pdf.

